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I. INTRODUCTION

It has become exceedingly common in our legal system that courts,
in the guise of respect for precedent, compound upon errors. Legal
precedents are written documents, but “[t]he reality we can put into words
is never reality itself.” 1 As such, we seldom find a court decision that
embodies the entire legal reality regarding the questions presented. In this
respect, the legal system inherently suffers from a lack of what
mathematicians call completeness. Each decision gives rise to countless
inferences because what lower courts observe by reading the precedent is
1. GRAHAM JONES, LYOTARD R EFRAMED: INTERPRETING KEY THINKERS FOR THE ARTS 15
(2014) (quoting German theoretical physicist and Nobel Prize laureate Werner Heisenberg).
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not the entire legal reality but an incomplete reality exposed to their
method of questioning. In such a framework, “we may hope to understand
[the precedent and correctly apply it], but we may have to learn at the
same time a new meaning of the word ‘understanding.’” 2
The recently revived and expanded Kessler doctrine demonstrates
how a particularly incomplete decision sets the stage for developing a
chaotic jurisprudence by lower courts, where lower courts’ interpretations
and applications of the doctrine are no longer directed toward a unifying
center. The famous Brazilian novelist Paulo Coelho narrated an anecdotal
story that best describes the evolution of the Kessler doctrine (or better to
say courts’ interpretation of Kessler) since its conception in 1907. 3
Coelho’s story begins with a great Zen master who kept a cat by his
side during meditation classes. After the master’s death, the oldest disciple
took his place, who, in homage to the memory of the late master, decided
to allow the cat to continue attending the classes. The story began to
spread to neighboring monasteries that a cat had been taking part in the
meditations. Years later the cat died, but the students, so accustomed to
its presence, acquired another cat. Meanwhile, other monasteries began
introducing cats into their meditation classes, believing that the cat, and
not the great master’s excellence in teaching, was responsible for his
teaching quality. “A generation passed, and technical treatises on the
importance of the cat in Zen meditation began to be published. . . . And
thus, for a century, the cat was considered to be an essential part of the
study of Zen Buddhism in that region.” Finally, a new leader arrived, who
was allergic to cats. So, he decided against having cats present in
meditation classes. Everyone fulminated against the decision at first, but
soon students realized that they were making progress, despite the cat’s
absence. Gradually, monasteries began to exclude cats from meditation
classes. “It took two hundred years for everything to return to normal, and
all because, during that time, no one thought to ask why the cat was there.”
In this article, we argue that, much like the cat in Coelho’s story, the time
has finally come to eliminate the Kessler doctrine from our jurisprudence.
This article begins with a historical case analysis of the Supreme
Court’s 1907 decision in Kessler v. Eldred. 4 In a prior lawsuit, Kessler
had successfully defended his electric cigar-lighters against patent
2. WERNER HEISENBERG, P HYSICS AND P HILOSOPHY: THE R EVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE
201 (1962).
3. Paulo Coelho, The Importance of the Cat in Meditation, P AULO C OELHO S TORIES AND
R EFLECTIONS, https://paulocoelhoblog.com/2016/09/26/cat-in-meditation-3/
[https://perma.cc/
H4DY-KQKP].
4. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907).
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infringement charges by his competitor, Eldred. That case ended with a
judgment of no infringement, which was affirmed on appeal. Eldred then
turned around and began suing Kessler’s customers for selling the same
product that the court had already determined was noninfringing. The
Supreme Court held that the prior judgment provided Kessler with the
right to sell his cigar lighters and that right was enforceable in equity by
Kessler against Eldred for wrongful interference. Kessler was decided
prior to the 1930s merger of law and equity, liberal pleading rules, and
Declaratory Judgment Act (all of which changed the landscape of res
judicata), and long before nonmutual issue preclusion came into favor. 5
That said, we argue that Kessler looks like an easy case of defensive issue
preclusion, either by direct estoppel by Kessler or via nonmutual collateral
estoppel by the customers under Blonder-Tongue (1971) and its progeny. 6
We then focus on the post-Blonder-Tongue revival of the Kessler
doctrine by the Federal Circuit and criticize the Federal Circuit for treating
the Kessler doctrine as a separate and distinct, patent-specific doctrine. 7
We argue that the Federal Circuit’s 2014–2021 decisions expanded the
doctrine beyond its original holding to encompass situations well outside
of the scope of issue and claim preclusion. Some examples of these
situations include: cases where the issue of infringement was not actually
litigated or decided in the prior lawsuit; 8 cases where the prior lawsuit was
dismissed by the plaintiff rather than decided on the merits; 9 and cases
where the customer asserts the privilege even though they were not a part
of the original lawsuit. 10 These expansions, which we label “Kessler Cat,”
5. MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that
Kessler “was handed down by the United States Supreme Court in the heyday of the federal mutuality
of estoppel rule”).
6. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); see also, Bernhard
v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
7. Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The revival continued
unabated in subsequent years.
8. In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 961 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020). We note that prior to the
Federal Circuit’s decision in PersonalWeb, district courts were split as to whether the Kessler doctrine
is applicable in such cases. Compare CFL Techs LLC v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01445RGA, 2019 WL 2995815, at *4 (D. Del. July 9, 2019) (prior district court decision refusing to apply
the Kessler doctrine to a case voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff with prejudice since “no court has
determined that Defendants do not infringe Plaintiff’s patents”), with Molinaro v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 460 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (concluding that Kessler doctrine can bar a second lawsuit
even without a determination of noninfringement).
9. In re PersonalWeb, 961 F.3d 1365.
10. SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 791 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (permitting
customers to assert Kessler and rejecting the limits of Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 232 U.S. 413 (1914)). SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160, 1170 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (Kessler doctrine can apply to bar assertion of patents in the same family of the one originally
asserted).
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analogous to the cat in Coelho’s story, take Kessler beyond the limits set
by the Supreme Court in 1907, but without reckoning the resulting due
process or patent exceptionalism concerns. The situation invites the
question: why are the traditional rules of issue and claim preclusion
sufficient for all other areas of law except patents? So far, the courts have
not addressed these questions. Rather, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
expressed reticence in applying Kessler, even while expanding the
doctrine. 11
A Kessler Cat case is now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court,
and the Court has called for the views of the Solicitor General. 12 One
immediate goal of this article is to provide historical background and
critical guidance to the Court and those drafting briefs. We see two
primary paths for the Court in this or a future case: a narrow and a broad
path.
The narrow path is to reject the Federal Circuit’s Kessler Cat and
revert back to the original understanding of the Court’s 1907 decision.
The decision in Kessler is an “application of the well-established doctrine
of res judicata that a judgment estops the defeated party from denying, in
any suit between the parties or their privies, any fact established by the
judgment.” 13 That narrow approach would parallel the Court’s recent
action in Minerva Surgical, where it maintained the doctrine of assignor
estoppel while substantially limiting the Federal Circuit’s expansion of
the doctrine. 14
The broader alternative path would be to reject the Kessler doctrine
to the extent that it exists outside the bounds of trans-substantive
“traditional claim- or issue-preclusion principles.” The Court may simply
hold that the need for the Kessler doctrine is obviated due to the adoption
of nonmutual issue preclusion. 15 This broader path is in line with the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lucky Brand Dungarees, where the
Court rejected “defense preclusion” as a separate form of res judicata. In
either case, we see no need for the Court to repudiate its original decision
11. Brain Life, 746 F.3d at 1058 (noting that the continued existence of the Kessler doctrine is
“questionable” in light of modern claim and issue preclusion law); CFL Techs., 2019 WL 2995815,
at *3 (“The Federal Circuit has expressed reservations about the Kessler doctrine and has expanded
its reach only in limited circumstances.”).
12. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Patreon, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 66 (2021) (“The Acting Solicitor
General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.”).
13. Note, Res Judicata in Patent Cases, 25 HARV. L. R EV. 649, 650 (1912).
14. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 2298 (2021).
15. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1597 (2020);
see also, B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 153 (2015) (stating ordinary
preclusion principles apply when judging the impact of USPTO decisions in the trademark space).
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in Kessler, but to recognize that the doctrine as initially understood fits
only within the traditional guideposts of res judicata.
II. THE 1907 KESSLER DECISION: THE CAT E NTERS THE TEMPLE
Preclusion disputes always involve two (or more) actions, and the
key question is whether the outcome of the first action precludes
subsequent litigation of already decided claims or issues. Kessler follows
this general pattern, with the first action ending in a narrow claim scope
and a noninfringement determination. Three subsequent actions then
considered whether and when the outcome of the initial action would bar
relitigating the issues of infringement and patent scope. In the first two,
the patentee prevailed with the courts refusing to give res judicata effect
to the first judgment and instead broadening the patent scope to
encompass the accused devices. Finally, in the third case, the Supreme
Court stepped in to provide the original defendant, Kessler, with relief. As
you will see, although the Court provided relief against ongoing lawsuits,
it did not explain the basis for its conclusions or its source of law.
A. Eldred v. Kessler: The First Action and Finding of No Infringement
In the late 1800s, Kessler and Eldred were competitors in
manufacturing electric cigar lighters and other smoking paraphernalia.
The competing cigar lighters were apparently quite similar to each other
“so that it was not a matter of much importance to customers which lighter
they bought.” 16 Kessler was the first to obtain a patent covering a lighter
that aligned with his manufactured product. 17 To secure his own
competitive patent position, Eldred purchased an 1893 patent from
Chambers that introduced a trigger-operated, automatic ignition with
automatic extinguishing trigger release. 18 Eldred then sued Kessler for
infringing the Chambers patent and argued its claims should be given a
broad construction because using a single element to accomplish
“automatic extinguishing and igniting” was a “pioneer invention.” 19 The
trial court, sitting in equity, rejected the pioneer-invention status, instead

16. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 285 (1907).
17. U.S. Patent Nos. 562,395 and 598,489. See Kessler v. Inks, 108 F. 412 (7th Cir. 1901) (395
patent found invalid for want of invention).
18. U.S. Patent No. 492,913 (Chambers). This was perhaps the first lighter that extinguished
the flame upon release of the trigger.
19. Eldred v. Kessler, 106 F. 509, 517 (7th Cir. 1900).
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holding that the claims must be narrowly construed to avoid the prior art. 20
And that narrow construction led to a finding that Kessler’s product did
not infringe: “In view of the prior art, the claims alleged to be infringed
must receive a narrow construction. Any other construction would render
them void, as claims for what was old in art. Giving the patent a narrow
construction, the defendant’s device does not infringe.” 21 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the only features from the
Chambers patent exhibited by Kessler’s device were ones also found in
the prior art. 22 Thus, the appellate court agreed that the patent should be
narrowly construed and not receive equivalents scope beyond the strict
terms of the claims. 23
B.

Subsequent Actions by Eldred

Eldred lost the initial litigation against Kessler; however, he was not
deterred and quickly moved forward with infringement lawsuits against
two additional cigar lighter dealers, Kirkland and Breitwieser. 24
1. Eldred’s Suit against Kirkland
Kirkland was selling lighters under license from Kessler, the
successful defendant in the prior lawsuit. 25 Although similar, Kirkland’s
lighters were apparently not of identical make to the one that the Seventh
Circuit judged noninfringing. 26 In Eldred’s lawsuit against Kirkland, the
New York Circuit (trial) Court sided with the defendant by again narrowly
construing the claims and finding the patent not infringed. 27 The trial court
recognized that the scope of the patent had been previously “well
considered” by both a trial court and the Seventh Circuit. 28 However, it
20. Id. At the time, courts would give broader scope to patents covering “pioneer inventions.”
See, Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66,
268 (1977).
21. Eldred, 106 F. at 517 (appellate court quoting from the circuit (trial) court decision).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. We should note that Kessler also attempted to enforce his patents. See, Kessler v. Inks, 108
F. 412 (7th Cir. 1901) (‘395 patent found invalid for want of invention). The record is not clear, but
Inks may have been a customer of Eldred because Eldred’s attorney, Louis K. Gillson, represented
Inks in the litigation.
25. Eldred v. Kirkland, 130 F. 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1904) (“The defendant is using a device made
under patents . . . granted to Gruhlke and Kessler.”).
26. Certificate from
the Seventh
Circuit in Kessler v. Eldred
at 1.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sa3WeuaOtuYLc1iGkt_mXWBMElBOfoc1/view?usp=sharing
[https://perma.cc/7XJE-R48K].
27. Eldred v. Kirkland, 124 F. 553, 554 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1903), rev’d, 130 F. 342 (2d Cir. 1904).
28. Id.
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did not directly apply preclusion; instead, the trial court merely announced
that “this court . . . agrees with the holding of the [Seventh Circuit] in that
case.” 29
Patentee Eldred appealed the Kirkland decision to the Second Circuit
and won a reversal. 30 In particular, the appellate court concluded that the
Chambers patent was infringed once “the plainest equivalents” were
allowed. The court found that the Seventh Circuit and trial courts had too
narrowly construed the claims by barring equivalents altogether. 31 Thus,
by April 1904, we had two competing appellate decisions. The first
decision gave the patent a narrow scope and a resulting noninfringement
determination. The second decision offered a somewhat broader scope of
protection and a finding of infringement (albeit of a slightly different
product). Importantly, this broader scope given by the Second Circuit
gave Eldred hope that he might prevail if permitted a rematch against the
original Kessler lighters. 32
Note that in the early 1900s, these cross-circuit differences in patent
interpretation were a rather new phenomenon. The U.S. Courts of Appeals
had only recently been established in 1891. 33 Prior to that, appeals from
the trial court went directly to the United States Supreme Court and thus
avoided any interpretative circuit-split. The single-level appeal resulted in
a major backlog at the Supreme Court and left some patentees waiting
more than ten years for a decision. 34 Although Circuit Courts of Appeals
heard cases more quickly, the system had a serious problem: the “decision
of a court of appeals in any one circuit was of no binding effect in any
other circuit, and the doctrine of comity was not often applied . . . .”35 The
result was effectively “nine different courts of last resort,” each
potentially interpreting the same patent differently. 36 The setup in Kessler
was thus typical of the day, with the patent being narrowly interpreted in
one circuit and broadly interpreted by another. Beginning around 1900,
29. Id.
30. Eldred, 130 F. 342.
31. Id. at 347 (“We do not think the complainant is entitled to a broad construction of the claims
in issue, but we do think the claims should receive an interpretation sufficiently liberal to give him
the benefit of well-known equivalents, such, for instance, as the substitution of a weight for a spring
and one form of support for another.”)
32. See Eldred v. Breitwieser, 132 F. 251, 251 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1904) (recognizing that the two
appellate courts had “differently construed the scope of the patent in suit.”).
33. Evarts Act, 26 Stat. 828 (1891).
34. S TAFF OF S UBCOMM. ON P ATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND C OPYRIGHTS, S. C OMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH C ONG., S INGLE C OURT OF APPEALS—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Comm. Print
1959) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Conway report].
35. Id.
36. Id.
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various parties began a concerted effort lobbying Congress for a patent
law exception—a unified patent court or direct line to the Supreme Court
to cut through these problems. Those lobbying efforts continued with
legislation proposed annually through 1920 with a primary purpose of
having “one decision which should extend all over the country and be
binding in every circuit.” 37
2. Eldred’s Suit Against Breitwieser
In June 1904, following the Second Circuit’s broadening
construction, Eldred filed suit against Breitwieser in the Western District
of New York, alleging infringement of the same patent. Breitwieser’s
lighters were manufactured by Kessler and were “identical” to those found
to be noninfringing in Eldred v. Kessler. 38 Kessler assumed the defense in
the New York lawsuit on behalf of its customer (as may have been
required by the sales warranties). Kessler admitted that its lighters were
infringing under the Second Circuit’s claim interpretation in Kirkland, but
asserted “res adjudicata” and “estoppel” based upon the prior Seventh
Circuit decision. 39
The Breitwieser district court rejected Kessler’s preclusion defenses
and instead awarded a preliminary injunction to restrain Breitwieser and
its codefendants from continuing to infringe Eldred’s patent. 40 Primary
authority for the district court’s decision came from the 1884 Supreme
Court decision in Birdsell v. Shaliol. 41 In Birdsell, the patentee initially
won an action against the manufacturer, the Ashland Machine Company,
for infringing Birdsell’s patent covering a machine for threshing and
hulling clover-seed. 42 Although Birdsell received damages for the
infringement, the infringer became insolvent and could not pay more than
nominal damages. 43 Later, Birdsell sued Shaliol, who had used the
infringing machine previously owned by Ashland. 44 Shaliol defended on
the grounds of estoppel by judgment, arguing that the original judgment

37. Id. at 13 (statement of Thomas J. Johnson, patent attorney of New York).
38. Certificate from the Seventh Circuit in Kessler v. Eldred at 1. https://drive.google.com/file/
d/1Sa3WeuaOtuYLc1iGkt_mXWBMElBOfoc1/view?usp=sharing [https://perma.cc/7XJE-R48K].
39. Eldred v. Breitwieser, 132 F. 251, 251–52 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1904) (“[T]he lighters in
question admittedly are an infringement, as decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.”).
40. Id. at 251.
41. Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 487 (1884).
42. Id. at 485.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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ended the patentee’s claim as to the machine in question. 45 The Supreme
Court rejected those arguments and sided with the patentee. 46 In
particular, the Court ruled that payment of a damage award does result in
a future right to continue to use the infringing machine:
In the case of a license or a sale by the patentee, the rights of the licensee
or the vendee arise out of contract with him. In the case of infringement,
the liability of infringers arises out of their own wrongful invasion of his
rights. The recovery and satisfaction of a judgment for damages against
one wrong-doer do not ordinarily confer, upon him or upon others, the
right to continue or repeat the wrong. 47

Birdsell offered an important distinction between a license-of-rights
and merger-of-claim. Namely, an adjudged infringing product is not
treated as licensed even though the patentee’s infringement claim has been
satisfied and merged with the judgment. Of course, Kessler is a mirror
image of Birdsell and seeks to know what results from an initial judgment
of noninfringement.
C.

Anti-Suit Injunction Demand by Kessler

The fourth and final case involving Kessler and Eldred was filed by
Kessler in Indiana in July 1904. Kessler sued in equity, seeking an antisuit injunction restraining Eldred from suing users and sellers of the
lighter that the Seventh Circuit found to be not infringing. 48 The action
particularly included a request against the complaint filed in
Breitwieser. 49 In the lawsuit, Kessler argued that he had a right to continue
manufacturing and selling the noninfringing products without Eldred’s
interference. He further alleged that Eldred’s customer lawsuit was
causing great harm to Kessler’s business. Kessler argued that his
customers, intimidated by the prospect of being the target of Eldred’s
45. Id.
46. Id. at 489.
47. Id. at 488.
48. To be clear, the terminology of anti-suit injunction was not yet in use in the early 1900s,
but rather simply described as an injunction “against suit.” This type of injunction likely stemmed
from a more traditional “writ of prohibition.” David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England
Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J. 539, 545–46 (1986). However, unlike some writs of prohibition, the
injunction operates against the party and not the court. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.,
446 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2006); James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 B AYLOR L. R EV. 769,
780 (1999) (“The [antisuit] injunction applies only to the party being enjoined; it does not apply to
the court or judge presiding over the parallel case.”); George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit
Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 C OLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 593 (1990) (describing
15th century English origins of anti-suit injunctions as an expansion of the writ of prohibition).
49. Breitwieser, 132 F. at 252.
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future lawsuit, had “ceased to send in further orders for lighters, and
refused to pay their accounts for lighters already sold and delivered.”50
Still, the district court rejected the plea, and on appeal, the Seventh Circuit
certified the case for Supreme Court review, raising four questions: 51
1. “Did the decree in Kessler’s favor, rendered by the Circuit
Court for the District of Indiana in the suit of Eldred against
Kessler, have the effect of entitling Kessler to continue the
business of manufacturing and selling throughout the United
States the same lighter he had theretofore been
manufacturing and selling, without molestation by Eldred
through the Chambers patent?” 52
2. “Did the decree mentioned in the first question have the
effect of making a suit by Eldred against any customer of
Kessler’s for alleged infringement of the Chambers patent
by use or sale of Kessler’s lighters a wrongful interference
by Eldred with Kessler’s business?” 53
3. “Did Kessler’s assumption of the defense of Eldred’s suit
against Breitwieser deprive Kessler of the right, if that right
would otherwise exist, of proceeding against Eldred in the
state and district of his citizenship and residence for
wrongfully interfering with Kessler’s business?” 54
4. “If Eldred’s acts were wrongful, had Kessler an adequate
remedy at law?” 55
Both parties admitted that these questions were not controlled by any
direct precedent on point. Particularly, the recent advent of the regional
appellate court system meant that the geographic scope of the Seventh
Circuit decision was unclear, especially when faced with a contrary
Second Circuit decision.

50. Id.; Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 286 (1907).
51. Certificate from
the Seventh
Circuit in Kessler v. Eldred
at 1.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sa3WeuaOtuYLc1iGkt_mXWBMElBOfoc1/view?usp=sharing.
Note that in Brain Life, the Federal circuit panel mistakenly asserted “both the district court and
Seventh Circuit agreed with Kessler’s position and granted the injunction in the Illinois action.” Brain
Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In fact, both the district and appellate court
sided with the patentee.
52. Certificate from
the Seventh
Circuit in Kessler v. Eldred
at 1.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sa3WeuaOtuYLc1iGkt_mXWBMElBOfoc1/view?usp=sharing.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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The Supreme Court Kessler Decision

In a unanimous 1907 opinion, the Supreme Court sided with Kessler
as to all four certified questions. 56 The opinion was authored by Justice
William Moody, who had just been appointed to the Court in December
1906 as briefing in the case was ongoing. 57 Justice Moody’s opinion is
notable for its complete absence of citation to precedent. 58 The 900-word
decision does not cite or reference any prior decision, statute, or treatise
other than the prior litigation between the parties. 59 Still, the decision
offers a somewhat clear holding and some important clues as to its source
of law.
The decision first held that the original judgment by the Indiana trial
court entitled Kessler to continue manufacturing and selling the adjudged
noninfringing lighter without further interference from Eldred’s assertion
of the Chambers patent. Further, that entitlement was a nationwide right
(not just in the Seventh Circuit area) and ensured that the business could
be ongoing “without molestation by Eldred through the Chambers
patent.” 60
This portion of the opinion began with a recognition that the original
Eldred action focused on infringement; that Kessler defended on the
grounds of noninfringement; and that the judgment found
noninfringement. In other words, the issue of noninfringement was
vigorously litigated, actually decided, and necessary to the judgment in
the first action by Eldred. The Court then explained the impact of that
noninfringement judgment with some force.
[The original decision] conclusively decreed the right of Kessler to
manufacture and sell his manufactures free from all interference from
Eldred by virtue of the Chambers patent, and the corresponding duty of
Eldred to recognize and yield to that right everywhere and always. . . .
If rights between litigants are once established by the final judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction, those rights must be recognized in
every way, and wherever the judgment is entitled to respect, by those
who are bound by it. 61

56. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 290 (1907).
57. “Moody, William Henry”, Bibliographic Directory of the United States Congress.
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/M000883.
58. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/2

12

Crouch and Rafatijo: Patent Law's <i>Kessler Cat</i>

2022]

P ATENT LAW ’S K ESSLER C AT

63

Although the case effectively stopped lawsuits against Kessler’s
customers, the Court was careful to focus its attention solely on Kessler’s
rights:
We need not stop to consider whether the judgment in the case of Eldred
v. Kessler had any other effect than to fix unalterably the rights and
duties of the immediate parties to it, for the reason that only the rights
and duties of those parties are necessarily in question here. It may be
that the judgment in Eldred v. Kessler will not afford Breitwieser, a
customer of Kessler, a defense to Eldred’s suit against him. Upon that
question we express no opinion. Neither it nor the case in which it is
raised is before us. 62

The Court then ruled that Eldred’s harassment of Kessler’s customers
harmed Kessler in a way that allowed for an action at equity:
Kessler’s customers ceased to send orders for lighters, and even refused
to pay for those which had already been delivered. Any action which has
such results is manifestly in violation of the obligation of Eldred, and
the corresponding right of Kessler, established by the judgment. . . . [I]t
is Kessler’s right that those customers should, in respect of the articles
before the court in the previous judgment, be let alone by Eldred, and it
is Eldred’s duty to let them alone. 63

In concluding that an action in equity was proper, the Court noted
the potential of a multiplicity of suits leading to diminished sales and other
business penalties—especially if Eldred succeeds in the customer
lawsuits: “If Eldred succeeds in his suit against one of Kessler’s
customers, he will naturally bring suits against others. He may bring suits
against others, whether he succeeds in one suit or not.” 64 The Court
concluded that “[n]o one wishes to buy anything if with it he must buy a
law suit.” 65

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
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III. POST-KESSLER J URISPRUDENCE: MONKS ARE CONFUSED BY THE
CAT
A.

Immediate Aftermath of Kessler and Ongoing Issues of National
Uniformity

The legal grounding for Kessler is somewhat tenuous because the
1907 opinion did not cite any precedent, treatise, or other source of law.
Likewise, it did not mention res judicata, estoppel, bar, or merger. The
decision focused on the “effect of judgment,” but at the time that signal
could be referring to either type of preclusion and at law or equity. 66 A
1912 Harvard Law Review note characterized Kessler in terms that
suggest issue preclusion: the “application of the well-established doctrine
of res judicata that a judgment estops the defeated party from denying, in
any suit between the parties or their privies, any fact established by the
judgment.” 67 Likewise, a 1910 ABA report identified Kessler as a
decision on “res adjudicata.” 68 The ABA report noted that the ongoing
problem of patents being interpreted differently in each circuit would lead
to regionalism where certain patents were enforceable only in certain
portions of the country. 69 Thus, the desire for national uniformity in patent
law was likely a major aspect of the Supreme Court’s Kessler decision.
Post-Kessler, this lack of uniformity became still more confused, as
shown in the testimony of famed patent attorney Frederick Fish:
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held [in Kessler v. Eldred] that where
a patent is sustained in one circuit and held invalid in another, the
manufacturer in the latter may send his goods with impunity into the
former, although if he made them in that circuit he would be an
infringer. 70

66. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876) (“[T]here is a difference between
the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a
different claim or cause of action.”).
67. Res Judicata in Patent Cases, 25 HARV. L. R EV. 649, 650 (1912).
68. Report of the Committee on Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Law, 33 ANNU. REP. A.B.A.
539, 554 (1910) (identifying Kessler as a decision on res adjudicata).
69. Id. at 555–58.
70. Hearings on H.R. 14047 and E.R. 16650 before the House Comm. on Patents, 60th Cong.
(1908) (statement of Frederick P. Fish, representing the A.B.A. U.S. Congress) (reprinted in the
Conway Report); WILLIAM MACOMBER, THE F IXED LAW OF PATENTS 95 (2d ed. 1913) (“[T]hat court
carefully confined the decision to the single point that the original judgment was conclusive upon the
parties to it.”); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New American Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law:
Part II, 102 U. P A. L. REV. 723, 757 n.220 (1954) (Kessler “merely held that a victorious manufacturer
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In his testimony, Fish suggested that to establish uniformity in patent
law, there ought to be “a single court of patent appeals.” 71 In fact, calls for
a national patent court continued up until the onset of WWI, when they
were set aside by the ABA. 72 Throughout this time, the driving concern
was not doctrinal patent law but rather purely procedural: how should the
problem of relitigating the same patent in different circuits be
addressed? 73
In 1910, a few years after Kessler, the Supreme Court continued to
focus attention on the privity requirement of Kessler in the context of
cross-circuit patent interpretation conflicts. 74 Brill v. Washington Railway
& Electric Co. involved two separate customer lawsuits, rather than a
lawsuit against the manufacturer and later its customer. In the first lawsuit,
the asserted railcar patent was declared void for lack of patentable
invention. 75 Although the manufacturer of the accused products had been
involved in the first lawsuit in some manner, the Court was not presented
with “formal proofs” that the manufacturer had defended its customer in
the first lawsuit. Thus, the Court refused to apply Kessler to cut the
litigation short. 76 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes explained:
If the [manufacturer] was privy to the decree declaring the patent void,
there would be great force in the argument that that decree established,
as against the plaintiff, the right of the [manufacturer] to make and sell
the patented article, and that the right ought to be recognized in a suit
against its customer, defended by it. . . . [But] the formal proofs are
wanting. 77

In its analysis, the Court reevaluated the patented invention and
found it invalid, thus agreeing with the prior decision that the patent was
void. Although the Court considered the patent’s validity on the merits, it
gave considerable deference to the prior decision. “[W]e should be
unwilling to come to a different conclusion from that reached in the earlier
could enjoin subsequent suits by the patentee against his customers and left the effect of the judgment
on the customer undecided.”).
71. Hearings on H.R. 14047 and E.R. 16650, supra note 70.
72. See Edmund Wetmore, Patent Law, 17 YALE L.J. 101, 107 (1907) (calling for a national
patent appellate court even after Kessler to resolve ongoing problems of nationwide injunction);
Conway Report (halted by WWI).
73. Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 649 (2002).
74. Brill v. Wash. Ry. & Elec. Co., 215 U.S. 528 (1910).
75. N.J. St. Ry. Co. v. Brill, 134 F. 580, 585 (3d Cir. 1905).
76. Brill, 215 U.S. at 529.
77. Id. at 528–29. Justice McKenna dissented in the opinion but did not offer a separate
explanatory opinion.
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litigation . . . unless it was impossible to avoid the result.” 78 The Court
offers a hint that, if operating on a clean slate, it might have upheld the
patent but with a quite narrow scope, and even then, the defendant would
not have been infringing. 79
B.

The Rubber Tire Trilogy

Between 1910 and 1915, the Supreme Court decided three cases
surrounding Arthur W. Grant’s patent related to improved rubber tires. 80
The thorny issues in these cases arose because the patent had been held
invalid via final judgment in some courts, but later found valid in other
courts. Diamond Rubber Co. of New York v. Consolidated Rubber Tire
Co. was the first of the trilogy. 81 Justice McKenna, who had dissented in
the 1910 Brill decision, wrote the opinion for the Court. 82 In its decision,
the Court affirmed a Second Circuit decision upholding the validity of the
rubber tires patent, even though the patent had been previously found
invalid by the Sixth Circuit and an Indiana trial court. 83
The decision also narrowly interpreted Kessler with relation to this
cross-circuit situation. The Court was asked whether, under Kessler, the
patentee’s nationwide injunction against infringing uses of Grant’s patent
under the Second Circuit decision, if affirmed by the Court, should
include regional exceptions for those places already subject to the Sixth
Circuit decision. 84 The Court declined to answer but offered that any
expansion of Kessler should be done with caution: “The doctrine of
Eldred and Kessler, if carried to the extent contended for by the defendant,
will introduce radical and far-reaching limitations upon the rights of
patentees.” 85
Three years later, in Seim v. Hurd, the Court considered its second
rubber tire case and again offered a narrow version of the Kessler
78. Id. at 529.
79. Id. at 533 (“If the plaintiff’s claim could be sustained, which we cannot admit, it would be
confined to the specific form of link described. There would be little room for the doctrine of
equivalents.”).
80. U.S. Patent No. 554,675. See Seim v. Hurd, 232 U.S. 420 (1914); Rubber Tire Wheel Co.
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 232 U.S. 413 (1914).
81. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 444 (1911). Diamond
Rubber is most well-known for developing commercial success as evidence of invention even in
situations where the inventor did not understand how his invention actually worked.
82. Id.
83. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel Co., 116 F. 363, 364 (6th Cir.
1902).
84. Diamond Rubber, 220 U.S. 428.
85. Id. at 445.
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doctrine. 86 This case involved the Kokomo Rubber Company that had
previously won a verdict finding Grant’s patent invalid in Indiana circuit
court. When one of Kokomo’s customers was sued in New York, the
appellate court certified the case for Supreme Court review on whether
Kessler should be interpreted to render “purchasers and users of infringing
tires made by the Kokomo Company immune from prosecution by the
owners of the patent?” 87 Rather than answering the question, the Court
found that Kessler did not apply in the facts of the case because Kokomo
was supplying parts for making the tires rather than supplying the
completed would-be infringing articles. 88 The customer-defendants took
the major last step of assembling the supplies in an infringing manner. 89
Since the customers substantially contributed to the infringing act, the
result was that the supplier could not use Kessler as a shield.
It is not the case of the purchase of the article in question from one who
had a right to sell. There was no actual infringement until they made the
tire, and for their act in making it they could not escape liability by the
purchase of parts from others. 90

The third rubber tire trilogy case was also decided in 1914, captioned
Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., and hammered
home the message that the privity requirement is central to Kessler. 91 In
Rubber Tire, defendant Goodyear argued that the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeal’s decision invalidating the patent should protect all defendants.
The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that Kessler protects only
the original defendant and those in privity with the original defendant. 92
Furthermore, the Court imposed an important limitation on the Kessler
doctrine: because of the final adjudication in its favor, Kessler (and sellers
similarly situated as Kessler) cannot “demand that others should be
allowed to make and sell the patented structure in order that it might have
a market for its rubber.” 93

86. Seim v. Hurd, 232 U.S. 420, 421 (1914).
87. Id. at 425.
88. Id. at 426.
89. Id. (“It is thus apparent that the defendants themselves constructed the device, effecting that
union of the separate elements which alone could bring the structure within the patent claims.”).
90. Id.
91. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 232 U.S. 413 (1914).
92. Rubber Tire was also the first case to refer to the rights granted to a successful defendant
as a “trade right,” but the court tightly tied those rights to a commodity produced by the original
defendant and only while the commodity “retains its separate identity.” Id. at 419. Kessler offers “no
transferable immunity in manufacture.” Id.
93. Id at 419.
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The trade right of the respondent . . . is a right which attaches to its
product—to a particular thing—as an article of lawful commerce, and it
continues only so long as the commodity to which the right applies
retains its separate identity. If that commodity is combined with other
things in the process of the manufacture of a new commodity, the trade
right in the original part as an article of commerce is necessarily gone.94

These early post-Kessler reactions and distinctions make clear that
Kessler offered only a narrow extension to our understanding of the law.
Still, substantial confusion remained about whether Kessler created some
new doctrine or was instead simply a direct application of res judicata.
This confusion is evident in the 1911 Second Circuit opinion in Hurd v.
Seim:
On the one side, it is contended that the effect of [Kessler] was to give
immunity from further annoyance to an alleged infringer, who, when
sued by the owner of the patent, had finally prevailed; that his position
is, for all time, the same as if he had received a nonexclusive license of
even date with the patent and running for its full term, or as if there was,
as to him, no patent in existence. On the other side, it is insisted that the
decision of the Supreme Court [in Kessler] is extremely narrow; that it
proceeds entirely upon the theory of res judicata . . . . 95

In a later opinion in the same case, the Supreme Court sided with the
narrow view but failed to expressly indicate that Kessler was merely an
application of res judicata. 96 Thus, for years appellate courts were divided
on how to interpret Kessler. On one side, the Eighth Circuit explained
Kessler as “simply [an] instance[] of the application of res adjudicata to
. . . patent (Kessler Case) infringement actions,” and thus the expression
and holding of Kessler is “to be understood only as applying res
judicata.” 97 On the other side, the Sixth Circuit characterized Kessler as
“not really one of res adjudicata or of estoppel by judgment, because,
although there was identity of subject-matter, yet the identity of parties—
or equivalent privity—was not clear.” 98 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that

94. Id. at 418–19.
95. Hurd v. Seim, 191 F. 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1911). In the opinion, the Second Circuit certified
the question for the Supreme Court to shed light on Kessler: “We are much in doubt as to which is
the correct interpretation to be put upon the opinion in Kessler v. Eldred, and desire the instruction of
the Supreme Court for the proper decision of this appeal.” Id.
96. Seim v. Hurd, 232 U.S. 420, 424 (1914).
97. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickernick Co., 96 F.2d 978, 987 (8th Cir. 1938).
98. Wenborne–Karpen Dryer Co. v. Dort Motor Car Co., 14 F.2d 378, 379 (6th Cir.1926).
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to make an end of litigation is to be desired; but it should be done in the
orderly and efficient way pointed out by the Supreme Court in Kessler
v. Eldred, and not by an attempt to apply the rule of judgment-estoppel
in a case where mutuality, the fundamental principle of such estoppel, is
not present. 99

C.

Expansion of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion and New Procedural
Options

1971 is an important transition point because of the Supreme Court’s
Blonder-Tongue decision accepting nonmutual issue preclusion. This is a
major transition because prior Supreme Court cases required two-party
mutuality for issue preclusion. For example, in 1936, the Supreme Court
expressly required mutuality in Triplett v. Lowell. 100 In Triplett, the Court
held that a determination of invalidity in one case does not bar the patentee
from asserting the patent against a different defendant in another case:
“While the earlier decision may by comity be given great weight in a later
litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like decree, it is not res
adjudicate and may not be pleaded as a defense.” 101
In Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
mutuality requirement for patent cases, followed by the more general
announcement in Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore. 102 The result of
these cases in the Kessler context is a major development because the
determination and judgment of noninfringement in the original
manufacturer lawsuit could be directly relied upon by any customers
subsequently sued. In its opinion, the Blonder-Tongue Court highlighted
other systemic changes that impact the general law of preclusion—
notably “expansion of the definition of ‘claim’ in bar and merger
contexts.” 103 Notably, the merger of law and equity and the advent of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dramatically changed the approach to
claim preclusion because plaintiffs then truly had the capability of
bringing all of their related actions and demands within a single lawsuit.
As shown in Figure 1, Kessler fell from use and was rarely cited or applied
99. Id. at 380.
100. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 640 (1936), overruled in part by Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
101. Triplett, 297 U.S. at 642
102. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313; Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 323 (1979).
In Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court recognized that the move away from mutuality had already
been accepted by many federal and state courts across the country. See Allan D. Vestal, Res
Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. R EV. 1723, 1724
(1968) (noting the breakdown of the mutuality requirement in the issue preclusion context).
103. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 327.
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by courts for many years after Blonder-Tongue. 104 Notably, the Supreme
Court has not referenced Kessler since 1959, when a dissenting justice in
a nonpatent case cited it. 105 This is not surprising since the issue and claim
preclusion doctrines had expanded to fully encompass Kessler’s original
scope.
Figure 1

An additional major change during this time stems from the full
availability of declaratory judgment counterclaims. 106 In patent cases, it
has become common practice for defendants to include counterclaims
seeking declaratory judgments that the patent is invalid, not infringed, or
otherwise unenforceable. The counterclaims provide substantial leverage,
104. Figure 1 is a time series frequency chart based upon the results of a Westlaw search of all
cases citing to the 1907 decision in Kessler through December 31, 2021
105. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 512 n.2 (1959) (citing Kessler in the
dissenting opinion). The final Supreme Court citation in a patent case is found in Kerotest Mfg. Co.
v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185–86 (1952) (“a judgment in [an accused
manufacturer’s] favor bars suits against his customers”).
106. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure open the door widely to counterclaims in civil actions
for the purpose of more fully resolving the conflict between the parties. Some counterclaims are
“compulsory” if they fall within the transactional test repeatedly used within the rules. The notes (as
well as subsequent case law) provides that “[if] the action proceeds to judgment without the
interposition of a counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule, the counterclaim is barred”
by claim preclusion. F ED. R. C IV. P. 13 advisory committee’s notes to 1937 amendments. The
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 created a statutory remedy to “declare the rights . . . whether or
not further relief is or could be sought,” and it provided the district courts with original jurisdiction
over those cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/2

20

Crouch and Rafatijo: Patent Law's <i>Kessler Cat</i>

2022]

P ATENT LAW ’S K ESSLER C AT

71

especially following the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Cardinal
Chem. Co. v. Morton International, Inc., holding that a defendant’s
declaratory judgment counterclaims are not denied standing simply
because the plaintiff’s infringement claims are resolved. 107 The result,
then, is that a defendant seeking surety and full resolution of a dispute can
do so by maintaining declaratory judgment counterclaims even in the face
of unilateral dismissal by the plaintiff. Constitutional mootness and
standing serve as the only boundaries to this practice, and the Supreme
Court recognized in Kessler that interference with customers can establish
sufficient harm. 108
We suggest that the availability of declaratory judgment
counterclaims changes the game in the Kessler context because a
manufacturer in the original lawsuit has the power to protect its customers
fully even if a patentee hopes to avoid a negative verdict by dismissing
the case. In section 5.3, we walk through one model showing how the
availability of declaratory judgment counterclaims suggests that the
Kessler Cat has lingered too long in federal courts. But first we need to
explore the Federal Circuit’s revival and expansion of the Kessler doctrine
in recent years.
IV. THE KESSLER CAT: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REVIVAL AND
E XPANSION OF THE DOCTRINE
A century after the original decision, the Federal Circuit began to
revive and expand upon Kessler. Like Coelho’s story of the Buddhist cat,
the Kessler Cat was given new meaning and importance. In a trio of new
decisions, the court has identified the doctrine as serving an important
gap-filling role separate and distinct from other preclusion doctrines, and
that is likewise unmoored from key limits set by the Supreme Court.
A.

MGA v. General Motors: Kessler as Nonmutual Issue Preclusion

The Federal Circuit’s first foray into the Kessler doctrine began in a
somewhat smooth fashion with the 1987 case of MGA, Inc. v. General
Motors Corp. 109 Like all preclusion disputes, MGA involved two actions.
The original MGA case involved a license dispute in Michigan state court
to determine whether LaSalle Tool machines infringed on MGA’s patent.
The amount of royalties due depended upon whether certain LaSalle
107. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l., Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
108. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013) (example of how a broad covenant can
eliminate declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
109. MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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machines infringed the MGA patent. The Michigan court decided the
subsidiary issue in LaSalle’s favor, finding no infringement. Meanwhile,
MGA sued LaSalle’s customer General Motors (“GM”) in federal court
for patent infringement for GM’s use of the same LaSalle machines. That
second case would normally be swiftly excised by a federal court using
nonmutual, defensive issue preclusion, but 1987 Michigan courts had not
yet fully abandoned the mutuality requirement. 110 Even though the second
action was in federal court, whether a particular judgment has preclusive
effect is usually determined by the law of the court issuing the original
judgment. Thus, since the Michigan courts did not yet expect their
judgments to apply to nonmutual preclusion, it would be improper for the
federal court to do so.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit cited the reasoning of BlonderTongue, holding that Michigan courts would “apply the Kessler doctrine,
which in its effect may be compared to defensive collateral estoppel, to
give preclusive effect” to the prior noninfringement determination. 111
Still, the appellate court did not formally determine that Kessler was part
of the general law of preclusion. 112 Rather, the court suggested two
alternatives: that the doctrine is either (1) “a matter of substantive federal
patent law” or (2) “a long recognized exception to the mutuality of
estoppel rule.” 113 Although the court refused to expressly answer that
question, it decided the case as if it were the latter. 114
In MGA, the Federal Circuit began on the right track by indicating
that Kessler is a category of nonmutual issue preclusion. 115 The court
found no need to further cite or discuss Kessler in subsequent cases. That
changed in 2014 with Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc. 116 We argue that the
Federal Circuit went off track and substantially expanded the Kessler
doctrine in Brain Life and then compounded those mistakes in the
subsequent decisions of Speedtrack and PersonalWeb. 117

110. Whether a particular judgment has preclusive effect is usually determined by the law of the
court that issued that original judgment.
111. MGA, 827 F.2d at 734. LaSalle had also intervened in the second case in order to assert
preclusion and so also overcame traditional privity hurdles. Id. at 731.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 734–35.
116. Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
117. Id.; SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 791 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re
PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, 961 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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Brain Life: Kessler as a Separate and Distinct Doctrine

In Brain Life, the Federal Circuit found that neither claim preclusion
nor issue preclusion applied to shelter the accused infringer’s particular
situation. 118 Still, the court sided with the defendant by ruling that the
Kessler doctrine steps in and precludes “claims that are not otherwise
barred by claim or issue preclusion.” 119 Thus, although the court refused
to characterize the Kessler doctrine as a substantive patent-law doctrine,
it made clear that it is a patent-law-specific rule not confined to the bounds
of general law of preclusion, that is, doctrines of claim and issue
preclusion. 120 The court also expanded Kessler by extending its reach to
cover claims that had been dismissed without prejudice during the
litigation, thus rejecting the MGA issue preclusion approach.
As is the norm for preclusion cases, Brain Life involved a first
lawsuit ending in final judgment and a second case involving similar
claims or issues. The patentee originally sued its competitor Elekta,
asserting infringement of its imaging patent. 121 The lawsuit initially
asserted both apparatus and method claims, but the parties eventually
agreed to dismiss the method claims without prejudice. 122 The jury sided
with the patentee, finding Elekta liable for infringement. On appeal, the
Federal Circuit reversed that judgment after finding that a means-plusfunction claim element had been given an unduly broad construction. On
remand, the district court entered a judgment of noninfringement on the
apparatus claims.
Later, the same patent was licensed to Brain Life, who brought
another infringement lawsuit against Elekta. The new lawsuit was similar.
It accused many of Elekta’s same products previously judged not
infringing. There were also some differences. The new lawsuit asserted
method-of-use claims rather than apparatus claims and sought liability for
infringing activity that occurred after the original judgment had been
finalized.
The Brain Life district court dismissed the case on claim preclusion
grounds, holding that the causes of action asserted in the new action were

118. Brain Life, 746 F.3d at 1053–55.
119. Id. at 1055–56.
120. Id.
121. U.S. Patent No. 5,398,684 (filed Mar. 31, 1992).
122. Plaintiff’s assertions of infringement of the method claims were dismissed without
prejudice, as were defendant’s counterclaims of noninfringement. Order on Motions in Limine, Med
Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, No. CV-97-2271-RHW (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 55 [], Iss. 1, Art. 2

74

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[55:51

barred from relitigation. 123 In arriving at its conclusion, the district court
relied on two general guidelines. First, claim preclusion includes an
important use-it-or-lose-it principle. That is to say, following a judgment
on the merits, the entire cause of action as between the parties barred from
future litigation, even if some potential theories or claims had not been
asserted. 124 Second, although the Federal Circuit applies patent-specific
rules to define the scope of a cause-of-action for claim preclusion
purposes, those rules largely stem from the Restatement’s definition,
“which defines a cause of action based on the transactional facts from
which it arises.” 125 Applying these general principles, the district court
determined that the cause of action in the second lawsuit was within the
scope of the original lawsuit: the patent being asserted was identical, even
though different patent claims were at issue, and the products were
equivalent, even though the infringing activity occurred after final
judgment on the first action. 126
On appeal, though, the Federal Circuit rejected the claim preclusion
theory. 127 In particular, the court emphasized its bright-line patent law
precedent that infringing acts occurring after final judgment are not
considered part of the same “cause of action” of the prior lawsuit. 128

123. Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., No. 12CV00303-CAB (BGS), 2013 WL 12071643, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
See R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“If the judgment is in
favor of the defendant, the claim is extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on that
claim.”).
124. Here, “cause of action” has a specific definition in the context of claim preclusion. Claim
preclusion creates a terminology problem when used in the context of patent litigation since the legal
right being litigated is the patent claim. And, although the scope of claim preclusion is impacted by
the scope of the patent claims, they do not go hand-in-hand. In prior cases, the Federal Circuit dealt
with this situation by using the synonym “cause of action” for clarity. We will follow the court’s
approach of “other than in referring to the name of the doctrine itself, we will use the longer descriptor
‘cause of action’ when discussing claim preclusion issues; the term ‘claim’ will be used to refer to
patent claims.” Senju Pharm. Co. v. Apotex Inc., 746 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014); SimpleAir,
Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160, 1165 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
125. SimpleAir, 884 F.3d at 1165 (citing R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM.
LAW INST. 1982)
126. Brain Life, 2013 WL 12071643, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013).
127. Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
128. Id. (“[T]o the extent Brain Life’s allegations of infringement are directed … acts of alleged
infringement occurring after entry of the final judgment in the [prior] Litigation, those claims are not
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Quite simply, Brain Life could not have asserted
infringement claims against the products in question for acts of alleged infringement that postdate the
final judgment in the [prior] Litigation in the current litigation.”). Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon
Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (a party who sues a tortfeasor is ordinarily not
barred by a prior judgment from seeking relief for discrete tortious action by the same tortfeasor that
occurs subsequent to the original action); SimpleAir, Inc.884 F.3d at 1170 (“claim preclusion does
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Likewise, issue preclusion did not fully dispose of the case because the
prior lawsuit did not address the method-of-use portions of the patent.
However, the Federal Circuit then identified the Kessler doctrine as “a
separate and distinct doctrine” that “precludes some claims that are not
otherwise barred by claim or issue preclusion.” 129 In particular, the court
explained that Kessler is used as a mechanism to permit the “adjudged
non-infringer to avoid repeated harassment for continuing its business as
usual post-final judgment in a patent action where circumstances justify
that result.” 130 In order to achieve that goal, the court found that the
original judgment “bars all subsequent assertions of the same patent”
against Elekta products that are essentially the same as those judged to be
noninfringing in the original action. 131 In Brain Life, the Federal Circuit
cited MGA as recognizing the ongoing vitality of Kessler but then failed
to follow its own guidance set forth in that decision regarding the
comparability of Kessler to defensive collateral estoppel.
With Brain Life, the Federal Circuit breathed new life into the
Kessler Cat, whose life had been ebbing away following Blonder-Tongue.
In doing so, the Federal Circuit made at least two fundamental errors
despite its stated desire to meaningfully implement the Supreme Court’s
undertheorized precedent in Kessler. First, the court failed to recognize its
precedent tying Kessler to issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion.
In Kessler and its near progeny, the issues of noninfringement of the
particular patent claims in question had been actually litigated to a
judgment on the merits, and in its prior MGA decision, the Federal Circuit
itself had made the same connection. Brain Life’s total divorce from the
principles of issue preclusion represented a major extension of the Kessler
doctrine.
The Federal Circuit’s second error was then choosing to act by
identifying Kessler as a wholly new breed of preclusion. This error at least
partially stems from the Federal Circuit’s unduly narrow conception of
“cause of action” for claim preclusion purposes. 132 The court’s narrow
definition widened the “gap between [] preclusion doctrines” that it then

not bar a party from asserting infringement based on activity occurring after the judgment in the earlier
suit”).
129. The accused infringer had raised the Kessler Doctrine, but only as an explanation as to why
claim preclusion should apply and “under the general rubric of claim preclusion.” Brain Life, 746
F.3d at 1055–56.
130. Id. at 1056.
131. See id. at 1055-59.
132. See infra Section V.D.2. (discussing the court’s narrowing definition of cause-of-action in
patent cases).
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filled by giving expanded meaning to Kessler. 133 By following the general
law, the court could have instead found that the post-judgment
infringement was part of the prior cause-of-action under the
Restatement’s transactional test, depending upon the circumstances. 134
Otherwise, the court could have simply allowed the second case to
proceed on the merits.
C. SpeedTrack: The Customer Assertion of the Manufacturer’s Right
The second Kessler extension is the Federal Circuit’s 2015
SpeedTrack decision. 135 In SpeedTrack, the court doubled down on the
gap-filling role of the Kessler Cat but then further expanded the doctrine
by rejecting the few express limitations that the Supreme Court laid out in
Kessler and its progeny.
In SpeedTrack, the patentee originally sued Walmart for infringing
its database software method patent. 136 Walmart’s software system had
been provided as part of a “customized solution[]” by Endeca, LLC,
which had promised to indemnify Walmart for infringement. 137 Endeca
intervened in the lawsuit and eventually won a judgment of
noninfringement. 138 While the Walmart case was still pending,
SpeedTrack filed a separate lawsuit against Office Depot and others, also
accusing them of infringement for using Endeca software as customized
for their individual needs. 139 After losing to Walmart, SpeedTrack altered
its trial plan and only asserted infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 140 The result then was that the courts found no issue
preclusion since the issue of equivalents had not been previously
determined. 141 By that time, though, Oracle had purchased Endeca and did
not intervene in the second Office Depot case. 142

133. See Brain Life, 746 F.3d at 1056.
134. R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982)
135. SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 791 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
136. Complaint, Speedtrack, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C 06-7336 PJH, 2008 WL
2491701 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2008).
137. Endeca Technologies, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene at 7 Speedtrack,
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C 06-7336 PJH, 2008 WL 2491701 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2008).
138. Final Judgment at 3, Speedtrack, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C 06-7336 PJH, 2008
WL 2491701 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2008),; aff’d on appeal by Speedtrack, Inc. v. Endeca Techs., Inc.,
524 Fed. Appx. 651 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
139. See SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 2014 WL 1813292 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2014).
140. Id. at *5.
141. Id. at *7.
142. See SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 791 F.3d 1317, 1321-25 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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In its decision, the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s suggestion
that Kessler should be confined to its “original footprint.” 143 In particular,
the court found that the “rationale underlying the Kessler doctrine”
supports a customer’s assertion of the Kessler’s preclusive effect of a prior
judgment against the patentee. 144 This conclusion is in direct collision
with the 1910 Supreme Court decision in Brill v. Washington Railway &
Electric Co. 145 Still, SpeedTrack departs from the Supreme Court Kessler
cases in another significant way that has to do with the notion of the
“product” being sold. In Kessler, the product at issue was a cigar lighter
manufactured and sold by Kessler that “retain[ed] its separate identity” in
the hand of customers. 146 However, in SpeedTrack, Office Depot’s
accused acts of infringement were not using the software that Endeca
produced; instead, the use at issue involved an additional step that
provided search functionality on Office Depot’s websites. 147 That
combination at the customer site appears to fit within the Supreme Court’s
Rubber Tire caveat that the trade right only attaches to products
manufactured by the original defendant (i.e., Endeca), and “[i]f that
commodity is combined with other things in the process of the
manufacture of a new commodity, the trade right in the original part as an
article of commerce is necessarily gone.” 148 SpeedTrack offers an
example of one risk of patent-specific procedural rules. Here, the appellate
court claims freedom to reshape the law of preclusion without any real
bounds or dampeners from the general law. In this unmoored situation,
the court should have taken pains to ensure that extensions of existing law
are fully justified. Unfortunately, the court instead used the lack of transsubstantive precedent to shortcut the process of making new law.
D.

PersonalWeb Technologies: Eliminating the Requirement that
NonInfringement be Actually Litigated or Decided

The Kessler Cat finally became unmanageably engorged with the
2020 Federal Circuit’s PersonalWeb Technologies decision. 149 Unlike all
the prior Kessler decisions, the issue of infringement was not actually
litigated or decided in the initial lawsuit. There was no true judgment of

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1326.
Brill v. Wash. Ry. & Elec. Co., 215 U.S. 527 (1910).
Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 232 U.S. 413, 419 (1914).
See SpeedTrack, Inc, at 1328.
Rubber Tire Wheel Co., at 419.
In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC., 961 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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noninfringement but only a stipulated dismissal with prejudice by the
patentee.
Back in 2011, PersonalWeb sued Amazon and Dropbox for
infringing five separate patents covering methods for implementing a
“true” naming system for computer files. 150 The complaint alleged that
Amazon’s Simple Storage Service (S3) was infringing, and so was its use
by Dropbox. 151 In the case, Amazon denied liability and also asserted
counterclaims seeking declarations of noninfringement and invalidity. 152
After a somewhat negative claim construction decision, the patentee
stipulated to a dismissal of its case against Amazon with prejudice. 153
Amazon also voluntarily dismissed its declaratory judgment claims of
invalidity and noninfringement, albeit without prejudice. 154
Later, PersonalWeb sued a new set of Amazon customers, alleging
infringement of the same five patents based on their use of Amazon’s
S3. 155 Amazon intervened in the lawsuit and asserted the Kessler
doctrine. 156 As with the other prior cases, traditional claim preclusion did
not apply to alleged infringing acts that occurred post-judgment, i.e., after
the first case ended pursuant to a stipulated dismissal. Likewise, issue
preclusion did not apply to the question of infringement because that issue
had not been litigated or decided. 157
In PersonalWeb, the Federal Circuit found that Kessler applied to the
stipulated dismissal, holding that invocation of the Kessler doctrine does
not require “that issues of noninfringement or invalidity be actually
litigated.” 158 The court then distinguished its new model of Kessler from
that recited under MGA. 159 “As our subsequent decisions interpreting
MGA demonstrate, however, nothing we said in MGA limited Kessler to
requiring that the issue of noninfringement or invalidity be ‘actually

150. Id. at 1368; see also Complaint for Patent Infringement, PersonalWeb Techs, LLC v. NEC
Corp., No. 6:11-CV-655, 2013 WL 9600333 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2013).
151. Complaint for Patent Infringement, PersonalWeb, 2013 WL 9600333.
152. Answer to First Amended Complaint, PersonalWeb, 2013 WL 9600333.
153. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, PersonalWeb, 2013 WL 9600333.
154. Id.
155. In re: PersonalWeb Techs., LLC et al. Patent Litigation, 2019 WL 1455332, *1 (N.D. Cal.
April 2, 2019).
156. Id.
157. A stipulated dismissal with prejudice typically operates as an adjudication on the merits for
claim-preclusion purposes, but ordinarily should not of itself count as the actual adjudication of any
issue. See 18 C HARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. C OOPER, F EDERAL
P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 4435 (3d ed. 2016).
158. In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 961 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
159. Id.
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litigated’” 160 The court went even further to reject MGA’s characterization
of the Kessler doctrine as a branch of defensive collateral estoppel: “the
Kessler doctrine [is] a close relative to claim preclusion . . . rather than as
an early version of non-mutual collateral estoppel.” 161 Thus, since the
Federal Circuit treated the Kessler doctrine as a variant of claim
preclusion, a stipulated dismissal with prejudice was sufficient for
invoking the doctrine.
E.

Lamentations of the Cat

In this trilogy of cases, the Federal Circuit repeatedly engaged in
doublespeak. On the one hand, it expanded the Kessler doctrine; on the
other hand, it expressed doubts regarding Kessler’s provenance and
ongoing viability. In Brain Life, the court wrote that “the continuing force
of the Kessler doctrine in the face of the development of defensively
applied issue preclusion may be questionable on the precise set of facts
presented in the case at bar.” 162 Likewise, in SpeedTrack, the court
lamented that it “must follow Kessler unless and until the Supreme Court
overrules it.” 163 In each case, the appellate panel explained in one section
how it was extending Kessler while elsewhere in the same opinion noting
that the Supreme Court’s Kessler precedent tied its hands because the
facts “fit within its bounds.” 164
We believe the Federal Circuit found itself in a situation akin to the
scholars in Coelho’s story attempting to explain why a cat had been part
of meditation practice for more than 100 years. However, the more the
Federal Circuit invokes the Kessler Cat, the more it compounds upon
error. The Federal Circuit first characterized the Kessler doctrine as a
relative of defensive collateral estoppel, 165 then it treated the doctrine as a
patent-specific doctrine separate and distinct from the general law of
preclusion, 166 and now it describes the Kessler doctrine as “a close relative
to claim preclusion.” 167 It is evident that the Federal Circuit flounders
back and forth between these different characterizations of the Kessler
doctrine just to give meaning to an extremely undertheorized Supreme
Court decision.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 791 F.3d 1317, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id.
MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In re PersonalWeb, 961 F.3d at 1377.
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We believe that, had the Federal Circuit followed Coelho’s advice
and asked why the Kessler Cat was there in the first place, it would not
have committed these compound errors. In the next section, we turn to the
first principles of justice and there find support for a narrow and limited
interpretation of the Kessler Cat. Particularly, we will question what the
Federal Circuit tells us: that the Kessler Cat is important for keeping
everything running smoothly in patent law.
V. UNDERSTANDING KESSLER: WHY DID THE CAT E NTER THE TEMPLE?
In this section, we begin with a brief discussion of res judicata, 168
which is the bedrock of the Supreme Court Kessler decision. The focus of
this section, and this article in general, is not to reshape the underlying
theories of res judicata but rather on whether the uniqueness of patent
litigation demands patent-specific doctrines above and beyond res
judicata.
A. Res Judicata and its Evolution Since Kessler
Res judicata is a powerful tool: it permits a party to side-step a claim
or issue rather than face litigation costs and uncertainty. The doctrines of
res judicata always involve two (or more) actions, and the key question is
whether the outcome of the first action precludes subsequent litigation of
already decided claims or issues. The Supreme Court has observed that
the judge-made law of res judicata protects parties “from the expense and
vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of
inconsistent decisions.” 169 Similarly, the Latin maxim interest rei
publicae, ut sit finis litium suggests a broader social benefit that comes
with the final resolution of disputes whose ongoing nature risks
168. Res judicata terminology is somewhat confusing. This article endeavors to use the general,
broad definition of the term that encompasses both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. See Lucky
Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (2020) (“res judicata [is]
a term that now comprises two distinct doctrines regarding the preclusive effect of prior litigation,”
issue preclusion and claim preclusion); Leal v. Krajewski, 803 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1986). Many
cases alternatively use res judicata to refer particularly to claim preclusion and not issue preclusion.
Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) (“This Court on more than
one occasion has used the term ‘res judicata’ in a narrow sense, so as to exclude issue preclusion or
collateral estoppel . . . [in a manner] virtually synonymous with ‘claim preclusion.’”). Issue preclusion
also bends under its historic names of collateral estoppel, direct estoppel, estoppel by judgment, or at
times simply “estoppel”. Where possible, we have endeavored to tease-out the difference to
understand what courts are talking about.
169. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979); reiterated in Taylor v. Sturgell,
553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
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disturbance of the peace. At the same time, justice is not served by blindly
enforcing wrong decisions or carelessly cutting short due process and
access to the courts. Shortcuts do not equate with justice. In his pivotal
1970 article on the topic, Yale Professor Geoffrey Hazard posited that
demand for relitigation is due to underlying inconsistency in the law. 170
Legal professionals (the lawyers and judges) are unlikely to entertain
cases that have already lost on the merits unless they have “doubt about
whether the first adjudication was correct on the merits.” 171 Professor
Edward Cleary earlier referred to these cases as ones “where the operation
was a success but the patient died.” 172
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, res judicata is similar to stare
decisis: both are judge-made doctrines developed for public policy
reasons—preventing constant reconsideration of settled questions. That
said, they operate somewhat differently. Stare decisis involves exclusively
adhering to matters of law and principles established by precedent, and its
applicability to any pending case depends on the degree and form of
alikeness between the facts of the pending case and those of a prior one.
Res judicata, however, particularly deals with sheltering judicially
established facts of a prior case from attacks in a pending case, even
though its application also fixes the law of the pending case. The two
doctrines are also different in another important way: their degrees of
authority. As concisely articulated by Justice Brandeis, “[s]tare decisis is
not, like the rule of res judicata, [a] universal inexorable command.”173
Despite its high authority, stare decisis is not absolutely binding in
subsequent cases, and its application “is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court.” 174 Conversely, res judicata binds both courts and
litigants. It is because of this unassailable, binding effect of res judicata
that common–law judges defined the scope of res judicata so narrowly:
only parties to the former judgment or their privies may take advantage of
or be bound by res judicata. 175

170. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. C AL. L. R EV. 1036, 1041 (1971).
Hazard also criticizes the “judicial efficiency” justification—noting that relitigation is a small
consideration compared with the general costs of litigation.
171. Id. at 1041.
172. Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 339 (1948).
173. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare
decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal, inexorable command.”).
174. Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910).
175. On rare occasion, the courts find outlet valves for res judicata. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32 (1940).
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We believe that when Kessler was handed down, it was merely an
unorthodox application of res judicata. Its unorthodoxy stemmed from
how the judge-made law of res judicata was perceived and applied
normally at the time. However, the law of res judicata has shifted
dramatically over the past century. That transformational door was opened
with the adoption of new procedures embodied by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, including the merger of law and equity, expansion of the
“cause of action” to be transactional rather than form-based, 176 creation of
liberal permissive-pleading provisions, and adoption of the Declaratory
Judgement Act. Throughout this time, there was a recognition that the
terminology of res judicata was unclear. Perhaps the first profound change
in this area was proposed by Professor Austin Wakeman Scott, joint
Reporter of the First Restatement of Judgments with Professor Warren A.
Seavey: they criticized the “loose” use of terms such as res judicata and
collateral estoppel and suggested using the term “precluded by judgment”
instead. 177 Professor Allan Vestal later agreed that “[t]here is no clarity or
definitude in these terms, especially res judicata and estoppel.” 178 In that
article, Vestal introduced the terms “claim preclusion” and “issue
preclusion” for clarity. 179 Although some courts quickly began adopting
the terminology, 180 the transformation was hastened by the drafters of the
Second Restatement, who recommended replacing res judicata and
collateral estoppel with the “more descriptive English phrases ‘claim

176. Although this expansion substantially occurred under the Field Code prior to Kessler, the
scope of the claim Res Judicata purposes did not expand until later.
177. See Austin W. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. R EV. 1, 3 n.4 (1942)
(noting that the old terms were used in confusing ways but were so ingrained in practice that it made
the most sense to retain their use for the First Restatement) (referring to R ESTATEMENT (F IRST) OF
JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW INST. 1942)).
178. Allan D. Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. R EV. 33, 33
(1963).
179. Id. at 34 (“It is hoped that these terms will help in analyzing the cases and in reachin g
meaningful conclusions in the area.”).
180. See Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 31 (8th Cir. 1964) (citing Vestal, supra
note 178); Metros v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colo., 441 F.2d 313, 316 (10th Cir. 1970);
Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1973); Pan Am. Match, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 454 F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1972); Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 509 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (discussing “rules of res judicata and issue preclusion”); Lombard v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d
631, 635 (2d Cir. 1974).
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preclusion’ and ‘issue preclusion.’” 181 Still, most courts continue to use
the old phrases. 182
B.

Preclusion in Patent Cases as Trans-Substantive Law Rather than
Patent-Specific

Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1930s
marked an important transition in procedure, one away from
individualized forms and courts and into a trans-substantive approach to
procedure. 183 This means that courts generally use the same procedures
for all cases, regardless of substance. 184 Even before that time, both
equitable defenses and the law of res judicata were largely transsubstantive. 185 Over the past 100 years, trans-substantivity has become a
cornerstone principle that serves an important dampening role on judicial–
activism of the type we see in the Kessler Cat cases. This presumption of
broad trans-substantive approaches cannot control purely substantive
doctrinal questions such as the definition of prior art, but it certainly
applies to questions of preclusion or other “process law” questions. 186 We
are, for the most part, well past the days of Federal Courts creating new
substantive common-law actions, with substantive law being generally
181. Sterling v. United States, 85 F.3d 1225, 1227 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing R ESTATEMENT
(S ECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS (AM. LAW INST. 1980); see also Horwitz v. Alloy Auto. Co., 992 F.2d
100, 103 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW . INST.
1982)); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (citing R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF
JUDGEMENTS § 88(3) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, Apr. 15, 1975)); Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citing R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 88(3)).
182. For example, we used Westlaw to identify 5,000+ federal appellate opinions released
between 2015 and 2022 that referred to either “issue preclusion” or “collateral estoppel.” Of those,
the vast majority—92%—use the old term “collateral estoppel” while only 14% used the term “issue
preclusion.” 6% used both terms.
183. Robert M. Cover, For James WM. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718 (1975); Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503,
504–05 (1996); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEP AUL L. R EV. 371, 376 (2010) (“A procedural rule is trans-substantive if it applies
equally to all cases regardless of substance.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. P A. L. R EV. 1015, 1034–50 (1982) (recounting history of trans substantive movement with
pleadings).
184. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 1683, 1746 (1992) ( “‘[T]rans-substantivism’ requires that
the same set of rules be applicable to all cases . . . .”).
185. Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIO S T. L.J. 289, 328 (1993)
(identifying res judicata as trans-substantive).
186. See generally David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013
BYU L. R EV. 1191, 1204 (discussing that “[t]rans-substantivity is a matter of degree”). In his article,
Professor Marcus provides a realist spectrum spanning the gamut from doctrines that are
“unambiguously substance-specific” to “unambiguously trans-substantive.” Id. at 1207.
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subsumed by statutory control. However, courts still reign in the realms
of procedure, and trans-substantivity here applies to limit overzealous
implementations, including “outsized political influence, capture, or
bias.” 187
Furthermore, a trans-substantive approach to procedure has the
benefit of generality that enables all judges and lawyers, regardless of
their specialty, to practice in a wider array of contexts, which in turn,
lowers the barriers to entry for practice of law. Thus, as Professor Jennifer
Sturiale suggested, courts should only depart from this approach based
upon a “legitimate exercise of judicial lawmaking” that would include
showing that a specific, doctrinal-focused rule is needed and beneficial. 188
More generally, we suggest that a trans-substantive approach is more
likely to render law accessible and understandable to the citizenry rather
than being arcane and unduly specialized in a way that undermines its
democratic legitimacy.
1. Trans-Substantive Procedure as a Bulwark Against Capture
Our judicial system’s expertise structure in patent infringement cases
is somewhat unique. Cases begin with generalized federal district courts
that hear a wide variety of criminal and civil cases. 189 Appeals are then
heard by the specialized Federal Circuit, 190 whose primary expertise is
patent law, although the court also hears appeals in limited other
substantive areas. 191 The Supreme Court has a supervisory role, but it is
again a nonexpert court. In this setup, generalized trans-substantive rules
of procedure benefit both the district courts and the Supreme Court. 192

187. Id. at 1220–21.
188. Jennifer E. Sturiale, A Balanced Consideration of the Federal Circuit’s Choice-of-Law
Rule, 2020 UTAH L. R EV. 475, 508 (2020).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . . No State court shall have jurisdiction
over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”).
190. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the
United States . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted
a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
192. Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. R EV. 1413, 1458 (2016)
(suggesting “[s]omewhat pessimistically” that the use of trans-substantive law relying on general
principles helps to compensate for the Supreme Court’s “inexperience with technical elements of the
patent system.”).
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On several occasions, the Supreme Court has identified the particular
risks of capture and bias when the Federal Circuit decides patent cases. 193
In fact, over the past several decades, this conclusion has been a key theme
of a significant number of the Supreme Court’s “patent cases.” 194 Heeding
the Supreme Court’s caution against capture, the Federal Circuit has
formally treated issue and claim preclusion determinations as nonpatentlaw specific, indicating its desire to follow a trans-substantive approach
to procedure. 195 To that end, the court has also repeatedly cited the
Restatement as a source of general principles. 196 However, the Federal
Circuit’s continuous invocation of the Kessler doctrine as a unique,
patent-specific doctrine bucks the entire trans-substantive approach, and
thus, the Supreme Court should decry the Kessler Cat’s presence in the
temple as a vexatious aberrance.

193. Brian J. Focarino, Patent Law’s Unexceptional Future, 97 J. P AT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
S OC’Y 472, 490–91 (2015); Lee, supra note 192 at 1450 (identifying these generally as “transcendent
issues”); see also Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (appellate court
improperly created patent-specific rule instead of following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52); Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s generalist approach would provide
needed beneficial input); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839
(2002) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s “broader jurisdiction [provides] an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop
an institutional bias” in the context of “arising under” jurisdiction); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring the court to follow the trans-substantive “well-established
principles of equity”); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015) (rejecting a patentlaw specific interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (rejecting patent-specific rule of standing); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S.
150 (1999) (rejecting patent-specific rules of administrative law); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014) (applying general equitable principles instead of a patentspecific rule to determine attorney’s fees); Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365 (2019) (allowing
attorney fees in civil actions to force the USPTO to issue a patent); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251
(2013) (no special patent rule for arising under jurisdiction).
194. See, e.g., Dennison Mfg Co., 475 U.S. 809; Lab. Corp. of America Holdings, 548 U.S.124
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Holmes Grp., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. 388; Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
574 U.S. 318; MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. 118; Dickinson, 527 U.S. 150; Octane Fitness, LLC, 572
U.S. 545; Peter, 140 S. Ct. 365; Gunn, 568 U.S. 251.
195. Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that “application
of principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel is not a matter committed to the exclusive
jurisdiction of” the Federal Circuit); Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because this case turns on general principles of claim preclusion, not on any
rule of law having special application to patent cases, we apply the law of the regional circuit in which
the district court sits—here, the Ninth Circuit.”).
196. See Hartley, 869 F.2d at 1471 n.1.
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2. Two Doctrines of Issue and Claim Preclusion Fill the Entire
Space
Although res judicata includes a somewhat muddled history, the
doctrine is now quite clear and well developed, as evidenced by the
original Restatement of Judgments (designating merger and bar, collateral
estoppel, and direct estoppel) and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
(redesignating these claim preclusion and issue preclusion). 197 The
Supreme Court has now repeatedly stated that these two doctrines fill the
entire space. Most recently, in Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel
Fashions Group, Inc., the Supreme Court refused to recognize “defense
preclusion” as a “standalone category of res judicata” that would be
separate and distinct from issue or claim preclusion. 198 That case, litigated
in the context of trademark infringement, involved the question of
whether a defendant will be precluded from raising a defense that was or
could have been raised in the prior action. 199 In its decision, the Court held
that the answer to this question should be resolved based upon the general
law of preclusion—i.e., issue and claim preclusion—rather than resorting
to some additional standalone doctrine. 200
Petitioner in Lucky Brand pointed to examples where defenses had
been precluded in prior cases, and the Court agreed that, at times, defenses
may be precluded. 201 However, the Court concluded that the proper
approach to preclusion is simply to ask whether traditional res judicata
doctrines bar the defenses. 202 “Moreover, we doubt that these authorities
stand for anything more than that traditional claim- or issue-preclusion
principles may bar defenses raised in a subsequent suit—principles that,
as explained above, do not bar Lucky Brand’s release defense here.” 203
The Court provided examples. A defense may be precluded under
traditional claim preclusion principles if it is being used to nullify or
collaterally attack a prior judgment. 204 Likewise, a defense may be
precluded under traditional issue preclusion if it had previously been fully
litigated and essential to a prior judgment. 205 However, the facts of Lucky
Brand placed it clearly outside the scope of issue and claim preclusion
197. R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
198. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (2020).
199. Id. at 1592
200. See id.
201. Id. at 597-98.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 1597.
204. See 18 C HARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE
§ 4407 (3d ed. 1998); City of Beloit v. Morgan, 74 U.S. 619 (1868).
205. Lucky Brand Dungarees, 140 S. Ct. at 1597.
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doctrines, for neither of them generally “preclude[s] defendants from
asserting defenses to new claims” that rise from different operative facts
than that of the claims in the first action. 206
One difference between the defense preclusion and Kessler doctrines
comes down to stare decisis. The Supreme Court had never expressly
endorsed a doctrine of defense preclusion, and thus it was not faced with
overturning its prior precedent in Lucky Brand. But the Kessler doctrine
derives its name from the unrepudiated Supreme Court decision. We
suggest that no repudiation is necessary because Kessler’s res judicata
aspects are unremarkable. Just as the court in Lucky Brands explained how
prior instances of defense preclusion fit within the standard doctrines of
issue and claim preclusion, we also argue that Kessler fits as well. Further,
the Supreme Court’s on-point precedent also warns against expanding
Kessler, lest the lower courts inadvertently impose “radical and farreaching limitations upon the rights of patentees.” 207
Kessler certainly made new law at the time as to issues of nationwide
enforcement, anti-suit injunctions, and sheltering of customers—all as
prompted by the new appellate court system. Still, the effect-of-thejudgment aspect of the case was easily within traditions of what we now
call issue preclusion. The issue of infringement had been fully and finally
litigated on the merits in the initial action, and the subsequent action for
injunction was between the same parties. In fact, all the earlier cases
where Kessler was applied involved actual prior litigation of the
infringement issue and an actual court determination of
noninfringement. 208
One difficulty with our conclusions here is that Kessler and its
progeny do not spell out in full detail that the results were based upon the
doctrinal choice of what we now call issue preclusion. Further, although
the cases were actually litigated and decided on grounds of
noninfringement, the courts did not expressly state whether actual
litigation and determination was a requirement for the judgment to have

206. Id.
207. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 445 (1911).
208. The Kessler court was mindful of the privity requirement of res judicata, which at the time
required two-party mutuality. The court grounded its legal justification on protecting the rights of the
original litigant, Kessler. Despite this legal structure the effect of the case is still to cut-short a lawsuit
between Kessler and Breitweiser, a nonparty to the original case. In that light, we suggest that one
way of interpreting Kessler is as the first case supporting nonmutual defensive issue preclusion. See
MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (declining to say whether the
doctrine “is a matter of substantive federal patent law, or whether it is a long-recognized exception to
the mutuality of estoppel rule . . .”).
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effect. We are left with an obiter dictum question: what meaning do we
give to the silence?
This same question and debate arose at the time of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, although not particularly focusing on Kessler.
The Restatement’s reporters determined that precedent required an issue
be “actually litigated and decided” before attaching issue preclusion. 209
This approach was implemented over objection from Professor Vestal,
who cited a number of cases that seemingly only required that the question
to be “put in issue” in the original case rather than being actually litigated
and decided. 210 Professor Hazard (one of the reporters) responded to
Vestal’s objection by reading the details of those cases and finding that
“the statement [found in those cases] is plainly obiter dictum because the
issue in question actually had been litigated in the prior action. 211 “This is
true, for example, of Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co. and
Oldham v. Prichett.” 212 Vestal also cited a number of cases where
preclusion was attached following default judgment, and Hazard
responded that those cases would fall under the general rule of claim
preclusion because in each case the new subsequent litigation was an
attempt to abrogate the original judgment. 213 We believe Kessler and the
subsequent Supreme Court cases hinging on Kessler must be read through
the lens of Professor Hazard: if Kessler is within the issue preclusion
doctrine’s scope, which we argue it is, then the Kessler Cat can take part
in a litigation only if the issues of invalidity or noninfringement were
actually decided or litigated.
3. Kessler Facts Regularly Occur Outside of Patent Law
Although Kessler and Kessler Cat have only been applied in the
patent context, it turns out that parallel situations arise in many areas of
law, including various forms of intellectual property and product liability,
as well as franchise and contract disputes. The basic setup in these cases
involves an original Plaintiff who holds a cause of action against multiple
parties, including one party with greater responsibility (perhaps because
of contractual indemnification to the other parties). Area-of-law specific
principles have not been developed or applied in any of these other
209. R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
210. Allan D. Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 C ORNELL
L. R EV. 464 (1981).
211. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion
and Related Problems, 66 C ORNELL L. R EV. 564 (1981).
212. Id.
213. Id.
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situations. Rather, courts simply apply general principles of preclusion.
The copyright context offers a particular important addition to our transsubstantive analysis. Copyright and patent are constitutional siblings, and
the Supreme Court has a regular practice of comparing and unifying
approaches in both copyright and patent when applicable. 214
A key copyright-patent case on point is Media Rights Technologies,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. out of the Ninth Circuit. 215 In 2013, Media Rights
brought a patent infringement suit against Microsoft. 216 After a court in a
separate proceeding declared one of the patents at issue invalid, Media
Rights voluntarily dismissed that suit with prejudice. 217 Later, in 2017,
Media Rights brought a copyright infringement action against Microsoft
for allegedly distributing five billion copies of the allegedly infringing
products. 218 These were the same products accused of patent infringement
in the original 2013 suit, although a good number of the accused infringing
acts took place after the first case was dismissed. 219 The Ninth Circuit held
that Microsoft was generally entitled to claim preclusion since the
copyright action was part of the “same transactional nucleus of facts” as
the original patent-infringement allegations. 220 However, the court also
ruled that post-judgement sales are not precluded since Media Rights
“could not have sued on them when it filed” the first action in 2013. 221 An
important consequence of this ruling is that, even if it wanted to, Media
Rights would be unable to sue Microsoft’s customers for copyright
infringement based on the customers post-judgement use of the allegedly
infringing Microsoft products. Copyright suffers similar thorny issues to
patent in terms of successive litigation, customer lawsuits, nationwide
infringement, and limited trade rights, but the two areas have been treated

214. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (providing that using
patent law cases to decide copyright law claims is both appropriate and reasonable “because of the
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”). However, the Court has also cautioned that
“[t]he two areas of the law, naturally, are not identical twins” and care must be taken “in applying
doctrine formulated in one area to the other.” Id. at 439 n.19; see also Impression Prods., Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1539 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Although there may be a historical kinship between patent law and copyright law, the two are
not identical twins” (internal quotation marks omitted)) (citing Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at
439, 439 n.19).
215. Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 922 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2019).
216. Id. at 1019.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1024.
220. See id. at 1028-29.
221. Id. at 1024.
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entirely differently in this regard without any justification other than
happenstance. Simply put, Kessler has no equivalent in copyright.
Had Media Rights Technologies been a patent case decided by the
Federal Circuit, the outcome of the case would have been different. The
Federal Circuit would have agreed that the general law of claim preclusion
does not bar an action against post-judgment infringement. But the court
would have then allowed its Kessler Cat to walk in the court and end the
second action.
C.

Asymmetric Incentives and Efficient Resolution

In this section, we argue that the Kessler Cat creates asymmetric
incentives between patentees and defendants to zealously litigate the
initial action in patent infringement cases. The Kessler Cat cases define a
rule that is prejudicial to patentees: it categorically and one-sidedly denies
patentees their “day in court” for dismissing claims in the initial action,
even if defendants also dismissed their counterclaims in an insouciant
fashion. The basic intuition here is that the patentee and defendant are
both in control of a patent-infringement lawsuit, with each raising mirrorimage claims of infringement and noninfringement. This symmetry is
recognized and accounted for in general preclusion law. 222 Nonetheless,
the Kessler Cat operates asymmetrically, which becomes particularly
pernicious when the issue of infringement is never actually litigated.
Consider PersonalWeb as an example. Back in 2011, PersonalWeb
sued Amazon and Dropbox for infringing five separate patents. 223
Amazon denied liability and asserted counterclaims seeking declarations
of noninfringement and invalidity. 224 For both PersonalWeb and Kessler
the patent asserted in the first and second action was the same, and in both
cases the seller-defendant intervened on behalf of its customers. That said,
the two cases are fundamentally different. Perhaps the key difference
between the two cases is the availability of counterclaims for the
defendant seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity,

222. For example, a defendant’s compulsory counterclaims are within the plaintiff’s original
“cause of action” for claim preclusion purposes. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469
n.1 (1974) (“A counterclaim which is compulsory but is not brought is thereafter barred.”). See F ED.
R. C IV. P. 13(a).
223. In re PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, 961 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Complaint,
PersonalWeb Technolgies, LLC v. NEC Corp., No. 6:11-CV-655, 2013 WL 9600333 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
21, 2013) PersonalWeb Technolgies, LLC v. NEC Corp., No. 6:11-CV-655, 2013 WL 9600333 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 21, 2013).
224. Answer to Amended Complaint, PersonalWeb, 2013 WL 9600333.
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and nonenforceability. Other differences between the two cases are shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison between Kessler and PersonalWeb
Kessler

PersonalWeb

Same Patents

Yes

Yes

Seller’s Intervention

Yes

Yes

Seller’s Market Power

No

Yes

Judgement of Noninfringement

Yes

No

Availability of Ongoing Declaratory
Judgment Counterclaims

No

Yes

Patent Claim Asserted

Product

Method

The Supreme Court has explained that those counterclaims can be
maintained even if the patentee seeks dismissal of its original action.225
As is now common in patent litigation, the seller-defendant (Amazon)
asserted these counterclaims in its answer to PersonalWeb’s complaint,226
then voluntarily dismissed those claims as part of PersonalWeb’s
dismissal. 227 Even after PersonalWeb’s dismissal, Amazon could have
continued forward with the counterclaims if it wanted to seek assurances
that the patents were truly invalidated or to clarify that the claims were
not infringed. 228 Given Amazon’s market power (which is exceedingly
greater than Kessler’s in electric cigar-lighters), it had every incentive to
225. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l., Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
226. Answer to First Amended Complaint, PersonalWeb Techs, LLC v. NEC Corp., No. 6:11CV-655, 2013 WL 9600333 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2013).
227. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, PersonalWeb (the counterclaims appeared to be
dismissed without prejudice and expressly state that “Defendants Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon
Web Services LLC retain the right to challenge validity, infringement, and/or enforceability of the
patents-in-suit via defense or otherwise, in any future suit or proceeding . . . .”).
228. We recognize our argument here requires a shift in perspective from the traditional notion
that a plaintiff is the “master of the lawsuit.” Although the plaintiff’s complaint does define the scope
of the cause of action, that scope is more generally a reflection of the underlying transaction or
occurrence that involved both parties as participants. We expect that these asymmetry insights have
application well beyond the limited scope of this article. In particular, the assumption of plaintiff-incontrol is reflected in a number of policy choices that might not make sense if we allow that the
defendant is also in control in the form of a declaratory judgment counterclaimant.
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litigate its counterclaims fully and vigorously in the first action. Indeed,
the external benefit gained by Amazon, that is, shielding its customers
against legal harassment by PersonalWeb, would have been enormous,
had it not dropped its counterclaims in the first action. As such, it is our
opinion that Amazon was the least cost avoider in this case, and, more
importantly, Amazon was compelled to not dismiss its counterclaims in
the initial action in the proper discharge of its duty to its countless
customers. This conclusion is supported by a case selection model based
on a cost/benefit analysis of litigation.
Suppose in a hypothetical patent infringement case, Patentee’s
ultimate likelihood of success on the merits against Defendant is P. If
Patentee prevails in the case, it will receive an award D, and if Patentee
loses, neither party will receive an award. In addition to the recovery of
damages by Patentee, the outcome of the trial, if not settled, can have
external effects—through the general law of preclusion—on future
litigation involving Patentee and other defendants. If Patentee prevails in
its lawsuit against Defendant, it will enjoy an external effect Gp , 229 but
Patentee’s loss will lead to an external cost Lp caused by the adverse
judgement. Under the assumption that Defendant proceeds independently
of future defendants, its interest in the lawsuit is represented by D,
whereas Patentee’s has larger effective stakes in the lawsuit, equal to D +
Gp + Lp . 230 In this case, Patentee’s expected payoff and Defendant’s
expected loss become, respectively,
E p = P × (D + Gp ) – (1 – P) × Lp
(1)
(2)
E d = P × D.
Assuming that the expenditures associated with full litigation of the case
is C, the sufficient condition 231 for litigating the case to the fullest extent
is
(3)
E p – E d > C.
229. Example of Gp: Now that the patent is enforced against D, the patentee can go after D’s
customers and sue them too with an improved likelihood of success against D’s customers. In
addition, a first successful assertion may also increase expected licensing success with respect to
unrelated third parties. Note that including Gp in the analysis does not negate the assumption that D
is acting independently from its customers. In fact, D may choose against intervening in P’s customer
lawsuits even if it wins against P. This may result from a situation where D was in the business of
selling pens, and now D is no longer in the pen selling business. In such a situation, D may have no
incentive to protect its former customers.
230. This model is consistent with the general understanding that plaintiffs in patent litigation
cases bear more risks than the accused infringer. See generally Joel Waldfogel, The Selection
Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. P OL. ECON. 229 (1995)
231. This is not a necessary condition because inefficient litigations can still happen as a result
of bargaining failures.
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Substituting for E p and E d and rearranging terms yields the following
condition for continuing the litigation fully
P × Gp – (1 – P) × Lp > C.

(4)

Note how the asymmetric interests of parties in the lawsuit, dictated by
the general law of preclusion, incentivize Patentee to invest more
resources in the litigation against Defendant. Otherwise, Patentee
potentially loses its claims against future defendants acting independently
of Defendant by the operation of the general law of preclusion that
effectively increases the external cost Lp . Be that as it may, nonetheless,
this conclusion is not applicable to PersonalWeb v. Amazon.com, because
Amazon and potential future defendants are in privity, that is, they are not
independent.
Suppose we have the same case as the previous hypothetical except
for the fact that future defendants are in privity with the Defendant in a
such a way that Defendant will bear some external effect Lp if future
defendants are later forced to litigate the patent after Patentee wins the
first lawsuit. Similarly, upon Patentee’s loss, Defendant will obtain the
external benefits Gd . Here, Defendant clearly has more at the stakes than
that it had in the previous hypothetical. Accordingly, Eq. (2) becomes
E d = P × (D + Ld ) – (1 – P) × Gd.

(5)

Substituting for E d in Eq. (3) using Eq. (5) yields
P × (Gp – Ld ) + (1 – P) × (Gd – Lp) > C

(6)

for the litigation condition. Note that Eq. (6) indicates that in an
infringement case where both Patentee and Defendant face some external
effects, the case must be fully litigated if doing so either generates
substantially large external gains for Patentee upon winning or
substantially large external gains for Defendant otherwise.
Now suppose—similar to what happened between PersonalWeb and
Amazon in the first action—both Patentee and Defendant settle the case.
In a situation like this, it is unclear if precluding Patentee from bringing
new action against Defendant’s privies promotes procedural fairness.
Defendant had been equally, if not more, incentivized to get a judgement
of noninfringement against Patentee in the original action, for doing so
would have generated huge external shielding benefits for its privies. It is
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evident that under the general law of preclusion, Defendant has no
recourse against Patentee’s going after its privies in future. This is because
it would have been more efficient if Defendant had either fully litigated
all issues in its case with Patentee and obtained preclusive benefits or
reached a settlement agreement that shelters its customers. To sum up, we
believe by fashioning new one-way preclusive benefits for defendants in
patent infringement cases, the rule of Kessler Cat cases promotes lousy,
inefficient dismissal of counterclaims by defendants.
D.

Modeling the Kessler Cat as an Extension of the General Law of
Preclusion

Another public policy concern associated with the rule of Kessler
Cat cases is that it is in direct collision with the general law of preclusion,
notably in cases like PersonalWeb that involve voluntary dismissal by the
patentee. To start, we note that it is unclear on what theories the preclusive
rule endorsed by the Kessler Cat cases operate. As we discussed in Section
4 above, the Federal Circuit is sitting on the fence between issue and claim
preclusion when it comes to the Kessler doctrine. The Kessler Cat is
sometimes characterized by the Federal Circuit as similar to the doctrine
of issue preclusion, and other times is described as a relative to claim
preclusion.
But which is it in PersonalWeb? Does it expand the scope of claim
preclusion even if the patentee has new “cause of action?” Or does it
preclude the patentee from litigating those issues that were not litigated in
the first action due to the dismissal? Either way, we believe the Kessler
Cat misleads the court to produce inconsistent results that in effect
undermine the general law of preclusion. We begin by examining the
Kessler Cat to find if it has any kinship with the doctrines of issue and
claim preclusion in PersonalWeb. Further, we show that the Kessler Cat
cannot be modeled under doctrines of misuse or license.
1. The Kessler Cat Fails as an Extension of Issue Preclusion
Per Federal Circuit’s own admission in MGA, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp., the Supreme Court fashioned the Kessler doctrine to operate as a
generalized doctrine of defensive collateral estoppel. 232 That is to say,
Kessler dispensed with the mutuality requirement for invoking defensive
collateral estoppel in patent infringement cases but only if the issue of
noninfringement or invalidity had been actually litigated in a prior action.
232. MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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MGA’s interpretation of Kessler is in fact meritorious. As we discussed in
Section 2.4 above, the Supreme Court cited deference to “the final
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction” to justify the rule in
Kessler. 233 If Kessler was not decided the way it was, then “[t]he judgment
in the previous case fails of the full effect which the law attaches to it.”234
As such, under MGA’s reading of Kessler, the doctrine is inapplicable to
a case like PersonalWeb, since a stipulated dismissal with prejudice
“should not of itself count as the actual adjudication of any issue.” 235
Note that, the Federal Circuit, in a sharp turn away from MGA, has
recently recharacterized Kessler as a substitute for claim preclusion, 236
perhaps in order to avoid elimination of the Kessler Cat from the ritual
solely based on nonlitigation of issues in the first action. Regardless of
this shockingly suspicious recharacterization, the Federal Circuit’s new
application of the Kessler doctrine can be effectively described as
nonmutual preclusion of issues that have not been litigated. Therefore, the
use of the Kessler Cat is not justified under the doctrine of issue
preclusion, since its effect is in direct collision with that doctrine.
2. The Kessler Cat Fails as an Extension of Claim Preclusion
Even the Federal Circuit’s mischaracterization of the Kessler
doctrine as an expansion of traditional notions of claim preclusion cannot
save the Kessler Cat. For one, such characterization promotes litigation of
premature claims that fail to present requisite case or controversy for
adjudication by patentees. For another, in IP law, it is well understood that
post-judgement acts of infringement, even if those acts are identical to
ones from the prior lawsuit, afford the IP right holder a new cause of
action that is not ordinarily barred under claim preclusion. 237 This is
233. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 289 (1907).
234. Id. (referring to the Seventh Circuit decision between Eldred and Kessler).
235. 18 C HARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE §
4433 (2d ed. 2002).
236. See supra, Section IV.D.
237. Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 922 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that
any sale of allegedly infringing Microsoft products after Media Rights Techs.’ voluntary dismissal
with prejudice of its initial copyright infringement lawsuit against Microsoft gave rise to a cause of
action as of the date of the sale, which is not precluded under claim preclusion); TechnoMarine SA
v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 502 (2d Cir. 2014) (“TechnoMarine’s trademark infringement claim
is not barred by claim preclusion because Giftports allegedly committed new instances of trademark
infringement after the settlement, so that the present claim, to the extent based on the new acts of
infringement, was not and could not have been litigated in the earlier proceeding.”); Aspex Eyewear,
Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“We hold that res judicata does
not bar Aspex’s lawsuit with respect to accused products that were not in existence at the time of the
California Actions for the simple reason that res judicata requires that in order for a particular claim
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consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawlor v. National Screen
Service Corp., that a prior judgment “cannot be given the effect of
extinguishing claims which did not even then exist and which could not
possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” 238
The Federal Circuit follows a strict rule that that post-judgement acts
by an accused infringer are separate and distinct from the claims of the
first action: “traditional notions of claim preclusion do not apply when a
patentee accuses new acts of infringement, i.e., post-final judgment, in a
second suit—even where the products are the same in both suits.”239
However, this strict rule is of somewhat recent vintage—most clearly
stated in its 2012 Aspex Eyewear decision. 240 That 2012 decision and its
subsequent reinforcement in Brain Life 241 implicitly overruled prior
decisions that had precluded infringement actions against post-judgment
activity under an “essentially the same” test. 242
to be barred, it is necessary that the claim either was asserted, or could have been asserted, in the prior
action. If the claim did not exist at the time of the earlier action, it could not have been asserted in that
action and is not barred by res judicata.”); see also 18 C HARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
F EDERAL P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE § 4409 (3d ed. 2018 update) (“A substantially single course of
activity may continue through the life of a first suit and beyond. The basic claim-preclusion result is
clear: a new claim or cause of action is created as the conduct continues.”).
238. Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955) (antitrust context); see also
R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
239. Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Dow Chem.
Co. v. Nova Chems. Corp. (Can.), 803 F.3d 620, 626 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“It is well-established that, as
to claims for continuing conduct after the complaint is filed, each period constitutes a separate
claim.”).
240. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335.
241. Brain Life, 746 F.3d 1045.
242. See Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that postjudgment actions may be considered part of a prior cause of action if “essentially the same” and “not
materially different”). Christopher Petroni, Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc. and Brain
Life, LLC v. Elekta, Inc.: Irreconcilable Conflict in the Law Governing Claim Preclusion in Patent
Cases, 14 C HI .-KENT J. INTELL. P ROP. 379 (2015).
In Sowinski v. California Air Resources Board, 971 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the court
misstated the holding of Brain Life as allowing claim preclusion to bar infringement actions against
a defendant’s post-judgment activity in a situation where the initial lawsuit ended in a judgment
favoring the defendant. Brain Life actually held the opposite—that situation claim preclusion does
not apply, but that the Kessler Doctrine may operate as a separate avenue to bar the second action.
Brain Life, 746 F.3d 1045. See Dennis Crouch, Doubling Up: Federal Circuit Mischaracterizes Both
Its Own Precedent and the Lower Court Ruling, P ATENTLYO (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/08/doubling-mischaracterizes-precedent.html
[https://perma.cc/KRE4-998G] (explaining that “the court reaches its result here only after
mischaracterizing both (1) the lower court holding and (2) its own prior precedent”). Sowinski
petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Federal Circuit’s “patent-specific preclusion doctrine
that bars new issues and new claims that would survive the ‘uniform’ preclusion rules applied by this
Court and every other circuit.” Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sowinski v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 20-1339
(U.S. 2021). The certiorari petition was not decided but was dismissed based upon a joint submission
of the parties presumably following a settlement agreement. Although the Federal Circuit did not
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Although the Federal Circuit treats the Kessler Cat as “a close
relative to claim preclusion,” 243 it still uses the Cat to bar causes of action
against conduct that could not have been anticipated by the patentee in
the prior action. 244 Of course, the scope of the ‘cause of action’ for
preclusion purposes has grown since 1907; however, we believe the
Federal Circuit’s approach goes too far, especially in a situation where the
patent claim at issue in the initial action was a method claim.
Consider Patentee asserts a method claim against Seller based on
Seller’s internal use of Patentee’s method claim. The Federal Circuit uses
the Kessler Cat to hold that, upon Patentee’s dismissal of its action against
Seller, Patentee will be forever barred from asserting the same method
claim against Seller (and its customers) if Seller begins, post-dismissal,
using the method claim to produce products for sale in the line of
commerce. This result is preposterous; a method claim can be used in
many different ways, and certainly Patentee’s dismissal of an action
against a particular use should not be interpreted by Seller as a green light
with respect to other uses of the method claim. This expansive reading of
Kessler encourages Patentee to prophylactically litigate, in the first action,
claims that are based on purely speculative conduct, despite Patentee’s
lack of standing regarding those claims as it had not yet suffered an injury
in fact when the first action was still pending.
3. The Kessler Cat Fails as an Extension of Doctrine of Implied
License
In PersonalWeb, the Federal Circuit suggested that PersonalWeb’s
with prejudice dismissal of the first action afforded Amazon an
unconditional, nonrevocable license to use PersonalWeb’s patent by
operation of the law of claim preclusion. 245 This proposition echoes
Kessler’s argument in its 1907 case against Eldred. In Kessler, the
appellant’s briefing primarily argued that the lower court’s
noninfringement holding should be treated effectively as a nonrevocable
license to practice the invention in the same way as previously done. 246
Despite the extensive briefing (most of appellant’s brief), the Supreme
reference Kessler in its Sowinski opinion, one way to characterize the case is as another Kessler Cat
decision that provides for preclusion in situations not reached by claim nor issue preclusion. Sowinski
is in-line with PersonalWeb Technologies because the bar on future litigation applied even though
the first lawsuit ended prior to consideration of the merits.
243. In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 961 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
244. Or, at a minimum, the court does not even consider whether anticipation is relevant.
245. PersonalWeb, 961 F.3d at 1378.
246. Petitioner’s brief in Kessler (on hand with authors).
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Court did not make that determination. If the prior judgement of
noninfringement by Kessler had been equivalent to him having a license
grant, then the Court would have surely passed rights to the customers
under the exhaustion principle (first sale doctrine). This is because the
principle of patent exhaustion applies to any product made by the patentee
or under license from the patentee. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of Kessler is certainly more expansive than what it was
meant by the Supreme Court in 1907.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Kessler doctrine was effectively
equivalent to the doctrine of implied license, the Federal Circuit is still at
error, for it treats this license as if it is an affirmative license to the
patent. 247 As we explained in Section 2.2 above, the Supreme Court in
Birdsell v. Shaliol suggested that an affirmative licensee of a patent and
its customers are discharged from any infringement claim by the patentee,
so long as the use by the licensee or its customers is within the scope of
the license. 248 Thus, by granting immunity to an alleged infringer’s
customers, upon the alleged infringer’s acquisition of a dismissal-based
license, the Federal Circuit effectively places the alleged infringer on the
same footing as an affirmative licensee. This is an implausible outcome
and against well entrenched principles of property law. 249

247. Under the Supreme Court precedent in De Forest Radio Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927): “Any language used by the owner of the patent or any
conduct on his part exhibited to another, from which that other may properly infer that the owner
consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts,
constitutes a license, and a defense to an action for a tort.” Thus, under a very expansive reading of
this holding, a dismissal with prejudice by the patentee could constitute the kind of “any conduct”
that manifests the patentee’s consent to the continuous use of the patent by the alleged infringer.
248. Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 487 (1884).
249. As a matter of general principle, property law construes the purpose and scope of use more
broadly for an affirmative license than a license obtained by the operation of law. For example, the
Restatement (Third) of Property provides that while it is proper to define the purpose of an easement
created by express grant more generally, “a more specific definition of the purpose is appropriate”
when the easement was acquired prescriptively. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF P ROPERTY: S ERVITUDES
§ 4.10 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). The license to use the patent acquired by an alleged infringer upon
dismissal with prejudice of the patentee is analogous to a prescriptive easement, for both are raised
by operation of the law. Thus, the same public policy reasons that justify narrow construction of
purpose for prescriptive easement dictates narrow construction of a settlement-based license. That is,
the scope and purpose of a settlement-based license is limited to those uses of the patent by the alleged
infringer of which the patentee had actual or constructive notice of at the time of dismissal. For
example, if the infringing conduct at issue was internal use of the patent for research and development,
the settlement-based license does not warrant selling the patent post-dismissal. Otherwise, the
patentee would not have dismissed the case had it known, actually or otherwise, that the alleged
infringer was selling the patents.
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4. The Kessler Cat Fails as a Doctrine of Patent Misuse 250
The doctrine of patent misuse is an extension of the equitable
doctrine of “unclean hands.” Under this doctrine, a patentee who uses its
patent to violate the antitrust laws is barred from enforcing the patent
against the infringers. 251 In the dispute between Kessler and Eldred, the
latter chose to go after the former’s customers. While it may appear that
Eldred’s acts had anticompetitive effects in the market for sale of electric
cigar lighters, that is not enough to bring Kessler under the doctrine of
patent misuse. 252 Furthermore, under the Federal Circuit’s patent misuse
jurisprudence, litigation against customers that effectively causes the
customers to cease dealing with the seller–defendant (which is similar to
what happened between Kessler and Eldred) amount to patent misuse only
if the patent being asserted was fraudulently procured. 253 Therefore, the
facts of Kessler do not support the conclusion that the Kessler doctrine is
an application of the common law doctrine of misuse.
By utilizing the Kessler Cat to bar PersonalWeb from enforcing—in
good faith—its patent against Amazon’s customers, the Federal Circuit
effectively treats PersonalWeb as a patentee misusing its patent. The
Kessler doctrine was not designed by the Supreme Court to serve as a
substitute for the doctrine of patent. And Federal Circuit cannot hide
behind the Kessler Cat to panelize the patentee for misuse and override
Congressional enacting under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CALLS FOR REFORM
Kessler was decided in equity during the time when mutuality was a
required element of defensive collateral estoppel. Thus, the Court sitting
in equity used its broad power to dispense with the requirement of
mutuality. In fact, Kessler paved the path for the Court to adopt nonmutual
issue preclusion in Blonder-Tongue. A few decades later, lower courts
erroneously began to interpret Kessler as “a matter of substantive federal
patent law.” A century after Kessler was decided, the Federal Circuit
began to interpret the Kessler doctrine as “a close relative to claim
250. To the best of our knowledge, no court has ever construed the Kessler doctrine in
conjunction with the patent misuse doctrine. However, to ensure that the Kessler Cat will not become
paramount to our patent law, we decided to add this section.
251. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 418–19 (1945).
252. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 625 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010) to hold that an infringement suit brought in good faith against the
defendant’s customers does not amount to patent misuse, because the suit “is a natural consequen ce
of the [customers’] infringing activities and does not suggest conduct coercive of the defendant . . . .”).
253. Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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preclusion” even if the element of mutuality, which has always been a
prerequisite for invoking claim preclusion, is absent. But the reality is that
the Kessler doctrine was only a rule of process and not patent-specific.
We believe, for instance, Kessler would have been decided the same way
had it been a copyright case.
The problems of the Federal Circuit’s Kessler Cat are easy to address
and fully within the power of the Supreme Court to develop “uniform
federal rule[s]” of res judicata for federal question cases. 254 Lucky Brand
Dungarees offers an exemplary model that the court could use to resorb
Kessler back into contemporary preclusion law and reject Kessler Cat to
the extent that it exists as a sui generis form of preclusion. This approach
will also necessarily reject the notion that Kessler is a patent law specific
doctrine and instead limit the power of res judicata to the “two distinct
doctrines” recognized by the Federal Courts, issue and claim
preclusion. 255 Part of the Federal Circuit’s desire to implement Kessler
Cat may stem from its hardline rule that claim preclusion does not extend
to post-judgment infringing actions. But the general law of claim
preclusion is not so clean cut. Rather, at times post-judgment activity can
fit within the original cause of action if sufficiently similar, consequential,
and anticipated.
This area is increasingly complicated by inter-jurisdictional
preclusion issues. Patent infringement is decided both by the Federal
Courts and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Similarly, patent
validity questions are decided by those tribunals as well as via
increasingly popular inter partes review proceedings before an
administrative tribunal housed within the Patent Office—the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB). Issue preclusion applies across the tribunals,
“[s]o long as the other ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met
. . . .” 256 Still, the cross-tribunal issues are sufficiently complex that
Congressional reform may be necessary.

254. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (quoting and contrasting Semtek Int’l, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 498 (2001)).
255. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (2020)
(“[R]es judicata: a term that now comprises two distinct doctrines regarding the preclusive effect of
prior litigation.”).
256. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 160 (2015) (trademark context).
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